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INTRODUCTION

The Low Income Housing Tax Credit ("LIHTC") program is "cur* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. Much of the
groundwork for this article was laid by Jarrett Tomis Barrios and Laura Lazarus, when they were
students at the Georgetown University Law Center. I thank them and also: Robert Schwemm and
James Kushner, whose work has been the foundation for those of us who work on housing

discrimination issues; Richard Gervase, for insisting that I write about the Low Income Housing
Tax Credit; Michelle Adams, Michael M. Daniel, Richard Gervase, Joseph Guggenheim, Tracy
Kaye, James Kushner, Laura Lazarus, Janet Ellen Steams, and the wisest of all housing gurus,
Arnold C. Sternberg, for very helpful criticism of drafts of this article; Lorena Bray, Victoria
Deak, Dilip Petigara, and Regina DeAngelis for able research assistance; Maureen F. McGovern,
Melody Morris, and Loretta Moses, for invaluable assistance in producing the article; and Enza
Klotzbucher and others on the staff of the Widener University School of Law Library, including
Patrick Charles, now Reference Librarian at Creighton University School of Law, for
extraordinary reference and research assistance. Research for this article began with a 1996
Summer Research Grant from the Widener University School of Law, for which I am grateful.
This article was written almost entirely at the Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis. I
thank my colleagues and students there for a supportive and stimulating environment. The paper
was presented at the February, 1998, Fair Housing conference sponsored by the University of
Miami Law Review. I benefitted from the conference participants' contributions and appreciate all
the hard work of the University of Miami Law Review Editorial Board.

1012

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1011

rently the largest federal program to fund the development and rehabilitation of housing for low-income households." ' From the initiation of
the program in 1987 through 1994, almost 500,000 units were placed in
service. 2 With the withdrawal of federal support for most other subsidized housing development programs, the LIHTC program stands as
essentially "the only game in town." 3 This most substantial federal subsidized housing program is administered by the Department of the

Treasury ("the Treasury") through state and local housing credit agencies and operates at a great cost to federal taxpayers.4
Despite massive governmental involvement, the LIHTC program
operates without effective regard to civil rights laws, due primarily to

the fact that the Treasury and state and local agencies have failed to
impose meaningful bars to discrimination. The Treasury and state and
local agencies administering the LIHTC lack information regarding the
extent of discrimination or segregation in the program. What little information is available suggests that tax credit developments are racially
segregated, and that developments serving minorities may be unequal to
those serving whites. Moreover, the Treasury fails to even refer to the
need to prevent segregation. The federal housing programs which began
in the 1930's have effectively imposed and enhanced racial segregation,5
1. See

GENERAL

ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

TAX

OVERSIGHT OF THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING PROGRAM
REPORT];

see also ABT Assoc. INC.,

CREDITS:

OPPORTUNITIES

TO

IMPROVE

Sec. 2 (March 1997) [hereinafter GAO

DEVELOPMENT AND

ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL Low-

INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT DATABASE: FINAL REPORT 1-2 (July 1, 1996) [hereinafter ABT

("The LIHTC has become the principal mechanism for supporting the production of
new and rehabilitated rental housing for low-income households.").
2. See ABT REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-3 and 1-4, Exhibit 1-1 (estimating that in the six
initial years of the program, 1987-1992, approximately 314,625 low-income units were placed in
service and an additional 118,000 units were provided from 1992-1994). Compare GAO REPORT,
supra note 1, at 32 (estimating that 172,151 units were placed in service from 1992 to 1994) with
E & Y KENNETH LEVENTHAL REAL ESTATE GROUP, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING
AGENCIES, THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT: FIRST DECADE,
42 (1997) [hereinafter
NCSHA REPORT] (stating that almost 900,000 units have been "created" or rehabilitated, which
may not necessarily mean that they have been placed in service). It is not clear whether the GAO
estimate of 172,151 is for precisely the same period as that for which Abt estimates 118,000.
3. See 24 C.F.R. § 81 (1998) (explaining that the LIHTC program is "the only major Federal
assistance program . . . that is currently active" for funding new or rehabilitated subsidized
housing units); NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 54 (HUD "continuously and steadily
disappear[s] from its mission of producing new affordable multifamily housing ...[T]he housing
credit ... has become the dominant source, indeed almost the exclusive source" of capital for
financing affordable housing).
4. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1,at 2 ("If all the credits authorized over a 10-year period
were awarded by the states to completed housing projects and used by investors, the annual cost
would be over $3 billion").
5. See CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 227-43 (1955); KENNETH T. JACKSON,
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 203-30 (1985); DOUGLAS
S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE
UNDERCLASS 51-54 (1993); Florence Wagman Roisman, The Lessons of AMERICAN APARTHEID:
REPORT]:
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causing "lasting damage. '"6

The LIHTC program seems now to be

repeating those past errors.
Although all federal agencies have been under a statutory mandate
since 1968 "affirmatively to further" non-discrimination and desegregation,7 "as new housing programs have evolved, successive administrations . . have repeatedly missed opportunities to combat
discrimination." 8 Perhaps the most blatant of the federal shortcomings
is the failure of the nation's largest subsidized housing program to
secure information about its compliance with civil rights laws and to act
effectively to prevent discrimination and segregation.

This article considers the civil rights obligations of the Treasury
Department and recommends actions necessary to satisfy them. Part II
describes the LIHTC program. Part III reviews the various civil rights
laws relating to the program and considers what obligations the federal

Fair Housing Act imposes on the Treasury in particular. Part IV suggests amendments to the Treasury's LIHTC regulations in order to

implement the Treasury's civil rights obligations.
II.

THE

Low

INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM

The 1986 Tax Reform Act created the LIHTC program. 9 Congress
The Necessity and Means of Promoting Residential RacialIntegration, 81 IOWA L. REv. 479, 48992 (1995) (addressing the federal government's role in creating and maintaining residential racial
segregation); Michelle Adams, Separate and [UnjEqual: Housing Choice, Mobility, and
Equalization in the FederallySubsidized Housing Program,71 TUL. L. REV. 413, 434-47 (1996)
(depicting the history of segregation in federal programs); Florence Wagman Roisman, Intentional
Racial Discrimination and Segregation by the Federal Government as a Principal Cause of
Concentrated Poverty: A Response to Schill and Wachter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1351, 1356-60
(1995).
6. See JACKSON, supra note 5, at 217; Arnold R. Hirsch, With or Without Jim Crow: Black
ResidentialSegregation in the United States, in URBAN POLICY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
65-66, 91-92 (Arnold R. Hirsch & Raymond A. Mohl eds., 1993) ("Competing, prior, and
contradictory government policies have already accelerated the separation of the races and frozen
the pattern in concrete."); MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE
WEALTH:

A

NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY

18 (1995) ("lasting impact" of FHA

discrimination). For a discussion of the harm resulting from discrimination and segregation, see
JOHN YINOER,

CLOSED DOORS,

OPPORTUNITIES LOST:

THE CONTINUING

COSTS

OF HousING

DISCRIMINATION (1995); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 5, at 148-85; Roisman, Lessons of
AMERICAN APARTHEID, supra note 5, at 506-12 (discussing the costs and benefits of integration);

Florence Wagman Roisman, Sustainable Development in Suburbs and Their Cities: The
Environmental and FinancialImperatives of Racial, Ethnic, and Economic Inclusion, 3 WIDENER
L. SYMP. J. (1997) (discussing the costs of segregation to suburbs); Scott A. Bolens, Concentrated
Poverty and Metropolitan Equity Stategies, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 11, 15 (1997) (discussing
the importance of desegregation).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d), (e)(5) (1998); see infra notes 77-120 and accompanying text.
8. Roberta Achtenberg, Keynote Address, Shaping American Communities: Segregation,
Housing & The Urban Poor, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1193 (1995).
9. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 252, 100 Stat. 2085, 2189-208.
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modified the program several times, most recently in the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.10
The LIHTC program allows owners of residential rental property to

claim tax credits, usually for ten years, for 30% to 70% of the present
value of new and substantially rehabilitated housing developments. 1 ' In
general, a project qualifies for the credit only if, for a period of 15 years,
the property owner rents at least 20% of the units to households with

incomes at or below 50% of the area median gross income ("AMGI"), or
the property owner rents at least 40% of the units to households with
2
incomes at or below 60% of AMGI.1
The LIHTC program requires substantial state or local government

action. The credit must be "allocated pursuant to a qualified allocation
plan ["QAP"] of the housing credit agency which [QAP] is approved by
the governmental unit.., of which such agency is a part."13 In addition,
the "chief executive officer ...of the local jurisdiction within which the
building is located" must have been offered "a reasonable opportunity to
comment on the project."' 4

The "primary source of equity financing for tax credit projects" is
private investors, who usually are recruited by syndicators.15 The investors' incentive is the expectation that for ten years they will "receive tax
credits and other tax benefits, such as business loss deductions, that they
10. See Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1002(1),
102 Stat. 3373-382; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7108,
103 Stat. 2306-322; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 1170,
104 Stat. 1388-505, 507; Tax Extension Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-227, § 107, 105 Stat. 1687;
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13142, 107 Stat. 437-40
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 42 (1994). The legislative history of the original act is
described in Janet Stearns, The Low Income Housing Tax Credit: A PoorSolution to the Housing
Crisis,6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 203, 208-10 (1988). For a thoughtful discussion of the purpose,
structure, and history of the program, see Tracy A. Kaye, Sheltering Social Policy in the Tax
Code: The Low Income Housing Credit, 38 VIL. L. REV. 871, 877-84 (1993).
11. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(b) (1994); GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 26. The applicable credit
percentage depends upon the type of LIHTC development: acquisition of existing projects,
rehabilitation, or new construction. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(b).
12. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(g)(l)-(g)(8) (1994). See also GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 25. The
incomes are to be adjusted for family size. Id. The number of these so-called "low-income units"
is important because the amount of the tax credit depends in part upon the number of "low-income
units" in the building as a percentage of the total number of units, or the floor space of "lowincome units" as a percentage of the total floor space in the building. See Difficult Development
Areas, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,340 (1995).
Although the program is supposed to encourage mixed income housing, the program "unduly
encourages projects where 100% of the units are tax credit-eligible." JOSEPH GUGGENHEIM, TAX
CREDITS FOR Low INCOME HOUSING: OPPORTUNITIES FOR DEVELOPERS, NoN-PROFrrs, AND
COMMUNITIES UNDER PERMANENT TAX ACT PROVISIONS at 137 (9th ed. 1996).
13. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(l)(A)(i) (1994).
14. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(A)(ii) (1994).
15. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 27.
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can use to offset the taxes they owe on other income." 16

LIHTC developments must be subject to a fifteen-year extended
low-income use agreement.1 7 If property on which a low-income housing credit is claimed ceases to qualify as low-income rental housing or is
credit compliance period, a
disposed of before the end of the fifteen-year
8
portion of the credit may be recaptured.1
LIHTC units are rent-restricted. If the credit is to be maintained,

gross rent, including an allowance for utilities, cannot exceed 30% of the
tenant's imputed income limitation (i.e., 50% or 60% of AMGI). 19 The
rent may in fact be more than 30% of the tenant's actual income.
The tax credit statute mandates that preference be given to "projects
serving the lowest income tenants ... for the longest periods of time."2
The LIHTC program has been justified and described as serving very

poor people. 2 In fact, however, the preference is not honored22 and the
16. Id. at 27-28. For a discussion of the LIHTC's attraction for equity investors, see the
NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-10.
17. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (h)(6)(A) and (D) (1994).
18. 26 U.S.C. §§ 42 (h)(6)(B), (D)(ii)(II), 42 (i)(1) (1994). The NCSHA REPORT asserts that
many states have required longer "lock-in" periods and that the average requirement may now be
forty-two years. See NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 61. See also Guggenheim, supra note 12,
at 27 (extended low-income use agreements).
19. 26 U.S.C. § 42(g)(2) (1994); GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 25. For an illustration of this
rent computation, see NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
20. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii) (1994).
21. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., lST SESs., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 at 152 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter GENERAL

EXPLANATION] (asserting that past tax preferences "failed to guarantee that affordable housing
would be provided to the most needy low-income individuals"); Earl C. Brewer, Jr. & Thomas L.
Kirkpatrick, The Low-Income Rental Housing Credit: The Last of the Investment Tax Credits, 16
J. REAL ESTATE TAX'N 233, 245 (1989) (the program is to provide "housing for the needy and
homeless").
22. As the GAO Report indicates, state agencies use a variety of definitions and ranking
techniques and exercise considerable discretion in selecting among applicants, so that the projects
that are funded are not necessarily those that serve the lowest-income people for the longest
periods of time.
Definitions of "low-income" vary. For example, GAO reports that "North Carolina targeted
its allocation to renters with incomes between 51% and 60% of their area's median income. North
Carolina's consolidated plan specified that renters with incomes between 0% and 50% of their
area's median income would not be served through the tax credit program." GAO REPORT, supra
note 1, at 61. Texas targeted its tax credits at households with incomes between 31% and 50% of
AMI. Id. Many allocation plans treated this and other preferences as selection criteria that could
be outweighed by other factors. Id. at 63.
Very low income residents, those with incomes below 30% of median, also are discouraged
by "up-front fees" and minimum income requirements. A survey in Washington State revealed
that tax credit developments imposed minimum income requirements and charged fees as high as
$400, not necessarily refundable, as damage deposits, application fees, credit check fees, and first
or last month's rent. SEATTLE DISPLACEMENT COALITION, THE WASHINGTON STATE Low INCOME
HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM: DOES THE PROGRAM TRULY SERVE THE NEEDS OF Low INCOME
PEOPLE AND PEOPLE OF COLOR? at 2-3 (1996) [hereinafter WASH. REPORT]. To enforce the

statutory preference for lowest income tenants, the Treasury should define "lowest income" as
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tax credit subsidy alone reduces rents only to a moderate level. Unless
households have additional subsidies, they can afford tax credit units
only if their incomes exceed 30% of area median income.23
In addition to the tax credit itself, most tax credit projects also

involve other subsidies.24 Some LIHTC residents have a particular form
of subsidy, Section 8 certificates or vouchers, with which tenants pay
30% of their household income and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD") pays the difference between the tenant
contribution and a fair market rent or payment standard.25
GAO reported that the households which "received rental assist-

ance generally had much lower incomes than those who did not" and
zero income, and should require that QAPs establish the preferences as threshold requirements
and assure that political decisions do not allow deviations from the standards. See GAO REPORT,
supra note 1, at 63.
23. See Kathryn P. Nelson, Whose Shortage of Affordable Housing?, 5 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 401, 402 (1994) ("Unless they have additional subsidies, LIHTC occupants must have
incomes between 40 and 60 % of the median to avoid severe rent burdens, and research shows that
families who occupy such units do have incomes in that range."). The NCSHA Report criticizes
the Nelson point but misrepresents it as characterizing LIHTC resident income as 50-60% of AMI.
See NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 9 & n. 1. In fact, the NCSHA Report's sample agrees with
Nelson, showing that tenants without rental subsidies (69% of the sample) averaged 45% of
median income. Id. at 7, 67. See also GUGGENHEIM, supra note 12, at 37 (Most projects without
additional aid serve moderate, not low, income persons). GAO estimated that LIHTC households
without rental assistance had average incomes of $16,700, about 32% of national median income.
See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 6-7. (The national median income in 1996 was $51,518 for a
family of four. U.S. Census Bureau, <http://www.census.gov/hhes/income/4person.html>).
These estimates are based on information provided to GAO by project managers of tax credit
projects. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 38. GAO also estimated that, for the units placed in
service from 1992 through 1994, about 75% of the resident households had incomes at or below
50% of area median income. Id. at 6. The NCSHA Report's sample households had incomes
averaging 38% of median income. See NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 7, 67. That survey was
of more than 110 properties comprising more than 10,000 units placed in service from 1992 to
1994. Id. at 67.
24. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 40, 6 & 13 (estimating that 71% of the households in
units placed in service between 1992 and 1994 benefit from some additional subsidy, "such as
rental assistance, other government loans, loan subsidies or grants"); Nelson, supra note 23, at 411
("More than three-fifths of LIHTC projects received an additional federal, state, or local
subsidy.") Federal subsidies include the rural programs and HUD's HOME, CDBG, and HOPE
(Housing Opportunities Made Equal, Community Development Block Grant, and Housing
Opportunities for People Everywhere) programs. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 12, at 109-12.
State or local subsidies to LIHTC developments include taxable bond financing, bridge financing,
subordinate financing, mortgage interest subsidies, operating subsidies, rental subsidies, equity
financing, real estate tax abatements, and state low-income housing tax credits. See Frank A.
Racaniello, Extending the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 22 RUTGERS
L. J. 753, 760 (1991); Jarrett Tomds Barrios, Government Fair Housing Obligations
Administering the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 13-14 (May 15, 1994) (unpublished
Georgetown University Law Center seminar paper on file with author); NCSHA REPORT, supra
note 2, at 25. Note, however, that a project earns a higher credit (70% of present value) if it is
financed without a federal subsidy, and only 30% of present value if it has a federal subsidy such
as a HUD loan or tax exempt bond financing. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (h)(4) (1994).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437(f), (o) (1994).
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that "without this rental assistance, these households might not have
been able to have afforded to live in their units."26 GAO estimated that

households with rental assistance had annual incomes averaging
$7,860.27 The NCSHA study reports that 31% of tax credit residents
have Section 8 existing housing vouchers and that these residents have
average incomes of about $9,250 and average 23% of median income.2 8
The NCSHA Report declares that Section 8 recipients in tax credit units

"are more likely [than other Section 8 recipients] to be working

families."29

As originally enacted, the LIHTC statute allowed the housing credit
agencies vast discretion in the administration of the credit, 30 but Con-

gress later amended the statute to set certain priorities for its use. In
1989, Congress added the mandate that the state or local allocating
agency must develop a QAP.3 1 With respect to each QAP, Congress set
four requirements: (1) each QAP must identify selection criteria,
"appropriate to local conditions," by which to choose among projects; 32
(2) each QAP's selection criteria must include some that have been
specified by Congress; 33 (3) each QAP must give preference to projects

serving the lowest income tenants for the longest periods of time;34 and
26. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
27. Id. at 6-7.
28. NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 67. It seems that "vouchers" is meant to include
Section 8 certificates. However, it is not clear why the $9,250 figure is so much higher than
GAO's estimate of $7,860 for tax credit residents with rental assistance.
29. Id. at 67. "According to HUD, the income of a typical Section 8 recipient nationwide is
18% of median (or about $7,250 annually for a family of four), an income.., below that of a full
time wage-earner." Id. Both the $9,250 and $7,250 figures are higher than the incomes of those
who rely on Temporary Assistance to Needy Families. The higher incomes of the Section 8/
LIHTC residents suggest that these may be full-time workers or aged couples. See TRACY L.
KAUFMAN, NATIONAL Low INCOME HOUSING COALITION, OUT-oF-REACH:

RENTAL HOUSING AT

WHAT COST? 77 (1997) (finding median SSI income for an aged couple living independently is
$705 monthly; for an aged individual, $470 monthly; median 1997 TANF grant for a three-person
household is $377 monthly). Finally, according to the NCSHA Report, "Housing Credit
apartments are occupied, in the main, by working families." NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 71.
(The NCSHA Report nonetheless found 124 Single Room Occupancy projects containing 8639
units, which presumably were occupied by very low income people. Id. at 50).
30. Thomas R. Wechter & Daniel L. Kraus, The Internal Revenue Code's Housing Program,
§ 42, 44 TAx LAW. 375, 385 (1991) ("As originally enacted, the low-income housing tax credit
provisions provided no guidance to the housing credit agencies with respect to the administration
of the credit.").
31. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2319 (1989)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 42(o)(1)(B) (1994)).
32. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(i) (1994).
33. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(c) (1994). These selection criteria are: "project location," "housing
needs characteristics," "project characteristics," "sponsor characteristics," "participation of local
tax-exempt organizations." "tenant populations with special housing needs," and "public housing
waiting lists." Id.
34. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(ii) (1994); see supra note 22.
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(4) each QAP must specify a procedure for monitoring compliance with
these provisions and for notifying the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
of noncompliance." As commentators have recognized, Congress'
1989 amendment of the statute meant that, "to some extent, Congress
has substituted its judgment for that of the state housing credit agencies
in enumerating the selection criteria and priorities to be taken into consideration in allocating the credit."36 However, as GAO has noted,
while "the Code specifically directs the agencies to include seven 'selection criteria' in their allocation plans[,] the Code does not define these
criteria or provide any guidance for their use."37 For example, the Code
requires that each QAP's selection criteria include "project location" and
"tenant populations with special housing needs," 38 but does not tell an
allocating agency what to do about these subjects. Moreover, the Treasury's regulations provide no further guidance on these standards. Also
in 1989, Congress amended the statute to encourage developers to locate
projects in certain areas39 by providing a 30% increase in eligible basis
for "any building located in a qualified census tract or difficult development area ...."40
In addition to requiring a monitoring procedure, Congress imposed
reporting requirements on both the agencies and the developers. Each
housing credit agency is required to submit to the Secretary of the Treasury an annual report specifying the amount of housing credit allocated,
identifying the recipient buildings and developers, and providing "such
35. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(iii) (1994).
36. Wechter & Kraus, supra note 30, at 385-86.
37. GAO REPORT, supra note 1,at 55.
38. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(c) (1994).
39. See Wechter & Kraus, supra note 30, at 392.
40. See also 26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(i)(I) (1994). "Since the LIHTC is a function of basis,
virtually all the important issues devolve into questions of 'eligible basis."' Edwin B. Schuck, The
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit for New Construction: Eligible Basis and Planning
Possibilities, 48 TAx LAW. 321, 322 (1995). For an outline of the method of calculating the
credit, see NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
A "qualified census tract" ("QCT") is one designated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD") in which 50% or more of the households have incomes less than 60% of
AMGI. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(c)(ii)(I) (1994); 60 Fed. Reg. 21,246 (1995). HUD has reported
that "Qualified Census Tracts will not be redesignated until year 2000 census data become
available." 60 Fed. Reg. at 21,246. Difficult development areas ("DDAs") are those designated
by HUD as areas with high construction, land, and utility costs relative to area median gross
income. 26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(c)(iii) (1994). As with Qualified Census Tracts, "all designated
Difficult Development Areas in MSAs/PMSAs may not contain more than 20% of the aggregate
population of all MSAs/PMSAs, and all designated areas not in metropolitan areas may not
contain more than 20% of the aggregate population of all non-metropolitan counties." HUD,
Statutorily Mandated Designation of Difficult Development Areas for Section 42 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, Part IV, 60 Fed. Reg. 48,340, 48,341 (1995); 26 U.S.C.
§ 42(d)(5)(C)(iii)(II) (1994).
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other information as the Secretary may require."" Furthermore, after
the close of each building's first taxable year, each developer must submit to the Secretary a certification setting forth certain specified information and "such other information as the Secretary may require."42
Congress also authorized the Secretary to require developers to submit
annual reports containing "such information as the Secretary may
require. 43 Yet, despite the provisions for agency reports to the Treasury, the Treasury lacks data showing the total numbers of LIHTC units
completed, project location, or occupant characteristics, other than
income and family size."4
For the GAO study, tax credit project managers were asked to provide information about the residents. On the basis of this information,
GAO estimated that:
* most of the households served were small: 67% included
one or
45
two people; the average household had 2.2 persons;
* 82% of the LIHTC units had two or fewer bedrooms;4 6
* 26% of the units were intended primarily to serve the elderly, and
about 5% were for persons "with special needs," 47
including people
with disabilities and previously homeless people;
* 64% of the households were headed by women; and
* 53% of the heads of households were white, 33% black, 11% Hispanic, and 3.5 "of other races. '"48
ABT, GAO and NCSHA have issued estimates with respect to project location. These reports suggest that more than half of the tax credit
units are in central cities and that these are more often rehabilitated than
newly constructed. Furthermore, these units are reported to be in census
tracts that are identifiably "minority" and also are areas of concentrated
poverty. Even in the suburbs, almost half of the tax credit units are
located in high-poverty areas, and 20% of the units are in census tracts
with more than 50% minority population.4 9 This suggests that our major
41. 26 U.S.C. § 42(1)(3)(c) (1994).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 42(l)(1)(E) (1994).

43. 26 U.S.C. § 42(1)(2)(c) (1994).
44. ABT and GAO note the "lack of centralized data Ii] on the tax credit program .. " GAO
REPORT, supra note 1, at 31. ABT reports that "information on the number of units actually
developed is difficult to assemble. Given the decentralized nature of the program, there is no
single federal source of information on tax credit production." ABT Report, supra note 1, at 1-2.
While "states are required to report on tax credit projects to the IRS. . . .these data are not
available for analysis due to the confidentiality of tax-related submissions." Id. at n.6. See also
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 32.
45. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 42.
46. Id. at 45.
47. Id. at 43.
48. Id. at 43.
49. ABT REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-16.
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contemporary housing subsidy program is producing separate and unequal housing.
The estimates with respect to location show that more than half54%-of the LIHTC units are in central cities, with "LIHTC units more
likely than other types of rental housing to be located in central cities,"5
while 26% of the tax credit units are in the suburbs.5" The remaining
units-almost 20%-are in rural areas. 2
Most of the central city LIHTC units-73.9%-are in census tracts
with more than 50% low-income households; and 48% of the units are in
tracts with more than 50% minority population. 53 Thirty-four percent of
all tax credit units are in areas with more than 50% minority population.5 4 ABT estimated that about 37% of the units placed in service
between 1992 and 1994 are located in DDAs and QCTs." NCSHA
reports that 39% of all properties involved rehabilitation.5 6 Thus, it
50. Id. at 4-7 (estimating that 54% of tax credit units are in central cities.). Cf Connie H.
Casey, Characteristics of HUD-Assisted Renters and Their Units in 1989 at 14 (HUD OPDR
March 1992) (estimating that 55% of Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") -assisted units are
in central cities). The ABT findings are consistent with GAO's estimate for the units placed in
service from 1992 through 1994: based on reports from tax credit project managers, GAO
estimated that 48% of the units were in "urban areas." GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 44. The
NCSHA Report states that 54% of all LIHTC projects are in central cities. NCSHA REPORT,
supra note 2, at 39. That would mean that more than 54% of the LIHTC units are in central cities.
Id. at 16. The report apparently treats "urban areas" and "central cities" as identical. The picture
accords with what knowledgeable observers had predicted. See, e.g.,
Quintin Johnstone,
Government Control of Urban Land Use: A Comparative Major ProgramAnalysis, 39 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 373, 403 (1994) ("much of this [LIHTC] housing [is] certain to be in distressed
inner-city areas.").
51. See A3T REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-7 (estimating for 1992-1994); see also NCSHA
REPORT, supra note 2, at 16 (finding that 26% of tax credit units are in the suburbs). By
comparison, 33% of FHA-assisted units are in the suburbs. See Casey, supra note 50, at 14.
52. ABT REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-7 (estimating that for 1992-1994, 19.5% of tax credit
units were in non-metropolitan areas). GAO reports that "almost one-third of the tax credit
properties placed in service between 1992 and 1994 were financed by RHS [Rural Housing
Service] mortgages." GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 41. Since this estimate is expressed in terms
of "properties," not units, the generally smaller size of RHS developments would explain why 1/3
of the properties, but only 1/5 of the units, are in non-metropolitan areas. The NCSHA Report
states that 20% of the units, but 30% of the projects, are in rural areas, "indicating that rural
projects tend to have smaller unit counts." NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 16. The percentage
of tax credit units in non-metropolitan areas is higher than the percentage of FHA units in nonmetropolitan areas: compare 19.5% for the tax credit units with 13% for the FHA units. Casey,
supra note 50, at 14.
53. ABT REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-16.
54. Id. at 4-15 to 4-17. Only 18% of all U.S. tracts have this characteristic. Id. Twenty-two
percent of the LIHTC central city units are in census tracts with more than 20% female-headed
households, although only 5% of all U.S. census tracts have this characteristic. Id.
55. Id.at 4-10.
56. NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 42. Wholly apart from civil rights concerns, the great
extent of rehabilitation raises questions about the cost-effectiveness of the LIHTC program, as one
of the justifications for the program is that it "build[s] new affordable housing and add[s] to the
overall supply." Id. at 63, 64 & 66.
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appears that at least one-third of the tax credit allocations rehabilitate
inner-city housing for minorities in minority, high-poverty
neighborhoods .57
Indeed, the NCSHA report indicates that the tax credits in inner
cities may be being used to bail out projects subsidized under other programs: a number of states have used the housing credit to transfer project-based Section 8 properties to non-profit owners; others use the
credits in workouts of troubled properties.5 8 The NCSHA Report also
predicts that the LIHTC will be used to "write down the debt" of
existing subsidized projects, notably "properties whose operating costs
are higher than local market rents, or rural elderly high-rise properties." 5 9 Finally, the NCSHA report also predicts that the tax credit will
be used for privatization of HOPE VI projects.60
Even in the non-central city but metro areas-i.e., the suburbs48% of the LIHTC units were in tracts with over 50% low-income
households, 6 while only "about 29% of all U.S. Census tracts contained
over 50% low-income households in 1990. '' 62 In comparison to the central city units, the "metro"-suburban-units are in census tracts that
have fewer poor households, fewer minorities, fewer female-headed
households, and more homeowners. 63 Nonetheless, 20% of the suburban tax credit units are located in neighborhoods with more than 50%
minority population.'
It is likely that many of the tax credit developments are providing
segregated housing, i.e., housing that is racially or ethnically identifiable. Since one-third of all LIHTC units, and 48% of those in central
cities, are in tracts with more than 50% minority population,65 the
existing method of site selection does not seem to be promoting racial
integration, unless the LIHTC residents in the minority tracts are not
57. "The Housing Credit is routinely used for new construction of suburban or rural
apartments" and other uses. NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 59.
58. Id. at 54-55. The credit has "been used as a workout device for HUD properties, usually
in conjunction with a transfer of troubled or aging HUD properties to new ownership." Id. at 55.

59. Id. at 55. The reference is to Section 8 project-based developments. NCSHA reports that
this use is "speculative, but there can be no doubt that communities will consider using the
housing credit to protect their investment in good properties." Id. The NCSHA Report also refers

to the use of tax credits for "preservation of potential economic conversions." Id. at 54-55.
Without offering authority, the Report describes the credit as "a resource magnet in urban
revitalization, attracting . . . HOME, CDBG and HOPE VI funding as part of a community
reinvestment strategy." Id. at 42.
60. Id. at 55-56.
61. ABT REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-16.
62. Id. at 4-15.
63. Id. at 4-16.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 4-15 to 4-16.
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minorities and the LIHTC residents in the predominantly white suburbs
are people of color.66 However, an experienced observer of the LIHTC
program, Joseph Guggenheim, suggests that "left to their own devices,
most projects tend to be occupied by one ethnic or racial group.

' 67

He

adds that "in order to comply with the spirit of the fair housing law,
owners need to take affirmative steps to market available units to all

ethnic and racial groups in the area."' 68 As indicated below, not only the
spirit but also the language of the Fair Housing Act imposes that
requirement.
III.

THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS AND THE

LIHTC

PROGRAM

Although the LIHTC program is subject to federal, state and local
constitutional, statutory, and regulatory civil rights requirements, and
affects state and local agencies and private developers, this article
focuses only on the obligations imposed by federal law on the Treasury
Department. Further, the article addresses discrimination and segregation solely on the basis of race, color, or national origin, rather than
discrimination and segregation on other bases.6 9
66. The LIHTC market may be segmented on another dimension, with profit-oriented
developers outside the cities (in predominantly white areas) and non-profit developers in the cities
(in predominantly minority areas). This was presented as fact in a discussion of corporate
motivation for investing in tax credit funds and projects. Peter Lampert, Senior Tax Counsel for
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, observed that "[i]f the corporation desires to
maximize return, it will likely invest in for-profit syndicators with affordable housing projects
located in the suburbs. Alternatively, if it desires to assist in targeting affordable housing where
the need is greatest, it will invest with nonprofit syndicators in blighted inner-city areas." Peter
M. Lampert, Corporate Investment in the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, 79 J. TAX'N 344, 344
(1993). Lampert further explains that "most of the projects of the nonprofits ... are developed in
neighborhoods where social problems may depress market values." Id. at 347.
67. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 12, at 137. Economic integration may be served, since 48% of
all LIHTC units, and 73.9% of LIHTC central city units, are in low-income neighborhoods. This
would be true only if the residents of these LIHTC developments are not those who also have
Section 8 certificates or vouchers. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
68. Id.
69. The term "race" is used despite the difficulties of defining the term. See, e.g., RACE AND
OTHER MISADVENTURES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ASHLEY MONTAGU IN HIS NINETIETH YEAR (Larry
T. Reynolds and Leonard Lieberman, eds., 1996); IvAN HANNAFORD, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN
IDEA IN THE WEST (1996); F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK?: ONE NATION'S DEFINITION (1993).

What we know about the LIHTC program suggests that other kinds of discrimination and
segregation warrant consideration. The predominance of small units and small households raises
questions about familial status discrimination: the Treasury's obligation "affirmatively to further"
non-discrimination against and integration of families with children does not seem to be advanced
by a program that produces very few units with more than two bedrooms and serves an average
household of 2.2 persons. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 42; cf DeBolt v. Espy, 47 F.3d 777
(6th Cir. 1995) (finding inadequate standing for challenge to Department of Agriculture's
emphasis on small units). Additionally, because the states in their consolidated plans have
identified 67% of the needy population as large families, this allocation does not seem to satisfy
the Internal Revenue Code's requirement of selection criteria "appropriate to local conditions."
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The Treasury's civil rights obligations have four principal sources:
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964,70 the United States Housing Act,71 and Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968.72 The LIHTC statute itself has only one provi-

sion with explicit civil rights content, § 42(h)(6)(B)(iv), which directs
that no tax credit shall be allowed absent an agreement between the taxpayer and the housing credit agency which prohibits a refusal to lease to
a Section 8 certificate or voucher holder because of such Section 8 status. In addition, there is one Treasury Department LIHTC civil rights
regulation, 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(a), which mandates compliance with

HUD directives.
The Fifth Amendment forbids intentional discrimination on the
basis of race, ethnicity, or other "suspect" characteristics, except where
the government can demonstrate a compelling interest in pursuing the
discriminatory conduct.7 3 Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohib26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(1)(B)(I) (1994). On an even more fundamental level, tax credit projects may
simply unlawfully discriminate against families with children. See Wash. Report, supra note 20,
at 2-3 (In 1992, 7% of the projects not identified as senior projects reported that they do not accept
children-this almost four years after the 1988 amendment to Title VIII made such discrimination
unlawful.)
GAO's report that 5% of the units are for persons "with special needs, including but not
limited to people with disabilities" raises questions about discrimination on the basis of handicap
and possible non-compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. See GAO REPORT, supra
note 1, at 43; 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). Additionally, the NCSHA Report says that forty-four of
forty-eight state housing credit agencies "target" special tenant groups, including persons with
various disabilities. NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 40. This raises concern that these states
may be encouraging the development of segregated facilities for people with disabilities.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (1994). There also are pertinent Executive Orders: Exec. Order No.
11063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963), reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12892,
3 C.F.R. 849 (1995), reprintedin 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994). The latter creates the President's Fair
Housing Council, of which the Secretary of the Treasury is a member. § 3-301.
73. See Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (holding strict scrutiny is required for
racial classifications); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976) (holding that challenge
to facially neutral law must show intent to discriminate as a law or official act cannot be found to
be unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disparate impact); Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (Arlington Heights I) (same,
with respect to housing discrimination); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that
the equal protection safeguards imposed on state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment
are applicable to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment).
The Treasury's role in the LIHTC program can amount to intentional discrimination if the
program is operated in a racially discriminatory way, and Treasury deliberately keeps itself in
ignorance of the racially discriminatory aspects of the program or otherwise participates in them.
In addition, where the federal government intentionally has imposed discrimination in other
programs, redressing that discrimination may require that Treasury's housing programs be used to
make the victims of the discrimination whole.
While there is little law regarding the extent to which one agency's programs may be used to
remedy another agency's illegal conduct, it has become almost commonplace to use newer HUD
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its discrimination "under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance. 74 The United States Housing Act provides that
HUD and "any other departments or agencies of the Federal Government having powers, functions, or duties with respect to housing, shall
exercise their powers, functions, or duties . .. in such manner as will
encourage and assist . . . the development of well-planned, integrated,
residential neighborhoods. 7 5 In leading cases, several courts of appeals
and district courts have held that the provisions of § 1441 are
programs to redress discrimination in older programs (e.g., using Section 8 to remedy
discrimination in public housing, a method the Supreme Court has endorsed in Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 303-05 (1976)). There are at least twelve other housing mobility
programs that use Section 8 certificates and vouchers to remedy discrimination and segregation in
public housing. See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER AND KALE WILLIAMS, HOUSING MOBILITY:
REALIZING THE PROMISE 11-12 (1998). Cf Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124, 132-34 (7th Cir.
1972) (holding that funding for model cities cannot be used to redress public housing violations).
However, it is unclear how the federal government's division into separate departments
immunizes one department's activities from judicial (or other) compulsion to participate in
remedying unconstitutional conduct by another department.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994): "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
Id. While the question has not been raised or resolved, it seems that the provision of tax credits
constitutes "federal financial assistance" within the meaning of Title VI. Title VI provides that
any "contract of insurance or guaranty" would be excluded from its coverage, but "other forms of
federal assistance" are included. The definition of "other government assistance" in various HUD
statutes specifically includes "credit, tax benefit, or any other form of direct or indirect
assistance." Section 102(b)(l) of the HUD Reform Act of 1989; § 911 of the Housing & Comm.
Dev. Act of 1992 and its 1994 amendment, regarding subsidy layering requirements. Indeed,
Section 911 of the 1992 Housing and Community Development Act explicitly includes the
LIHTC. 42 U.S.C. § 3545 (1994). Under the HUD regulations implementing Title VI, which
Treasury regulations make pertinent to the LIHTC program (26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(a) (1998),
"federal financial assistance" includes "any Federal agreement, arrangement, or other contract
which has as one of its purposes the provision of assistance." 24 C.F.R. § 1.2(e) (1998). On the
other hand, GAO reported that "tax credits are not considered as federal financial assistance under
Office of Management and Budget implementing guidance" and that therefore, "unlike most
programs operated by state and local governments that receive federal financial assistance, the
low-income housing tax credit program operations are not subject to independent audits under the
Single Audit Act ....
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
It is unclear whether Title VI is enforceable by a private plaintiff against a federal agency.
Several courts have held HUD liable to private plaintiffs for violating Title VI. See, e.g.,
Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1971). However, a 1983 Supreme Court
decision left that issue in doubt. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n. of New York
City, 463 U.S. 582, 593-97 (1983). See also Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v.
Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 928 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998) (explaining that the Supreme
Court established a private right of action under § 601 for intentional discrimination in Alexander
v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985)); Latinos Unidos de Chelsea v. HUD, 799 F.2d 774, 783 n.17
(1st Cir. 1986) (avoiding this "difficult question"). See generally ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 29.2, at 29-2 to 29-3 (1983). While intentional
discrimination is required to establish a violation of Title VI, the HUD regulations establish
liability for conduct with discriminatory effect. See 24 C.F.R. § 1.4(b)(2)(i) (1998).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
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mandatory, and that actions taken without consideration of them, or
inconsistent with them, cannot stand.7 6
The fundamental source of civil rights obligations imposed on the
Treasury Department's administration of the LIHTC program is Title

VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. In particular, the Act directs that:
All executive departments and agencies shall administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban development
(including any Federal agency having regulatory or supervisory
authority over financial institutions) in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of this subchapter and shall cooperate with the Secretary [of HUD] to further such purposes. 77
This provision extends to all federal agencies the same duty as is
imposed on the Secretary of HUD: to "administer the programs and

activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the policies" of Title VIII.78 The statute imposes on
the Treasury the obligation to administer the LIHTC program "ina manner affirmatively to further the purposes of' Title VIII.79

There are two sources of law with respect to the nature of a federal
department's duty under § 3608 "affirmatively to further" the purposes
and policies of Title VIII. One source is the caselaw developed under

§ 3608(e)(5), as both courts and commentators agree that the obligations
of §§3608(d) and (e)(5) are identical. 8" The second source is HUD's

regulations. While HUD has not promulgated regulations interpreting
the "affirmatively further" obligation, it has promulgated regulations
explaining Title VIII duties in general, as well as HUD's own responsi-

bilities in the administration of HUD's housing programs. These regulations provide a guide to the nature of the Treasury's obligations in
76. See Kirby v. U.S., 675 F.2d 60, 68 (3d Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Winthrop Towers, 628 F.2d
1028, 1036 (7th Cir. 1980); Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also
National Housing Law Project, HUD Housing Programs: Tenants' Rights § 16.5.3 (2d ed. 1994).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (1994). Before the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, this
section was § 808(c), and is so referred to in pre-1988 court decisions.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (1994). No one has suggested any distinction between the
"purposes" language of § 3608(d) and the "policies" language of § 3608(e)(5). The cases and
commentary uniformly treat the obligations as identical. See Jones v. Office of Comptroller of the
Currency, 983 F. Supp. 197, 204 (D.D.C. 1997) (applying § 3608(d) to the OCC, relying on cases
involving § 3608(e)); Jorman v. Veterans' Administration, 579 F. Supp. 1407, 1416 (N.D. I11.
1984) (applying the section to the VA and distinguishing Camden v. Plotkin, 466 F. Supp. 44 (D.
N.J. 1978), which held that then § 3608(c), now § 3608(d), did not apply to the Census Bureau
only because there was "no allegation of direct involvement ... in a housing project").
79. That the provision of low-income housing tax credits is a program or activity seems clear.
See Alexander v. HUD, 441 U.S. 39, 64-64 (1979). See also 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(l)(A) (1994)
(§ 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, defining program or activity).
80. See SCHWEMM, supra note 74, at § 21.1 ("all federal departments and agencies are subject
to the commands of § 3608").
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administering the LIHTC program. 8' Moreover, the Treasury regula-

tion, 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(a), makes HUD rules applicable to the tax credit
program.
A.

The Caselaw's Explication of the Duty
"Affirmatively to Further" Title VIII

The caselaw teaches that the "purposes" and "policies" of Title VIII
are dual: to eschew discrimination and to promote integration. 2 Each
federal agency has a hierarchy of obligations. First, Title VIII directs

that the federal agency must not itself "engage [] in discriminatory conduct. .. "83 Second, the agency must not "fund a grantee who is
engaged in such discriminatory conduct with the purpose of furthering
81. Some of HUD's regulations, including those governing the administration of the Federal
Housing Administration programs, represent HUD's interpretation of its obligations under
Executive Order 11063 and Title VI as well as Title VIII. But the requirements of Executive
Order 11063, supra note 72, and Title VI are encompassed by the obligation "affirmatively to
further the policies" of Title VIII. "Title VII's § 3608 contains an even clearer mandate to HUD
and other federal agencies to administer their programs affirmatively to further fair housing and
integration .... See SCHWEMM, supra note 74, at 29-4.
The most pertinent HUD regulations are 24 C.F.R. Part 200, Subparts I, M and N (1998)
(Nondiscrimination and Fair Housing, Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing, and Project Selection
Criteria for the FHA-Assisted Housing Programs) (1998) and 24 C.F.R. Part 121, Collection of
Data (1998).
82. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972). See
also SCHWEMM, supra note 74 at §§2.3, 7.2(2), and cases there cited. While
the nature of the duties imposed by § 3608(e)(5) is not spelled out in the statute, and
there was virtually no legislative debate regarding this question ... a number of
courts have agreed that the affirmative duties imposed by § 3608 are designed to
further the goal of integration and are not limited merely to banning discrimination
in federally assisted housing. This view finds support in the overall legislative
history of Title VIII.
Id. at § 21.1, pp. 21-4, 21-7-8.
While the cases acknowledge the dual goals, they also recognize that the goals sometimes
conflict. In these situations, the caselaw suggests that discrimination that advances integration is
permitted, if at all, only where it is temporary, provides additional access for minorities, and is
based on a history of discrimination. See U.S. v. Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d 1096, 1101102 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988) ("Congress saw the nondiscrimination policy as the means to effect the antisegregation-integration policy.... While quotas promote Title
VIII's integration policy, they contravene its antidiscrimination policy, bringing the dual goals of
the Act into conflict."); Burney v. Housing Authority, 551 F. Supp. 746, 770 (W.D. Pa. 1982);
Rodney A. Smolla, In Pursuitof Racial Utopias: FairHousing, Quotas, and Goals in the 1980's,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 947, 1004 ("Congress perceived antisegregation and antidiscrimination to be
complementary goals."); cf.Otero v. NYC Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1133-134 (2d Cir.
1973); Larkin v. State of Michigan, 883 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Mich. 1994), aff'd, 89 F.3d 285 (6th
Cir. 1996); South Suburban Housing Center v. Greater South Suburban Board of Realtors, 713 F.
Supp. 1068, 1180 (N.D. I11.
1988), affd in part and rev'd in part, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992).
83. NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 817 F.2d 149,
154 (1st Cir. 1987).
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the grantee's discrimination." 84 So much the agencies themselves concede. 85 In addition, the cases hold, as then-Judge, now Justice, Breyer
explained, that § 3608 imposes "an obligation to do more than simply
refrain from discriminating (and from purposely aiding discrimination
by others). 86 Title VIII prohibits not only intentional discrimination,
but also action that has a discriminatory effect.87 And § 3608 requires
the agency to take "affirmative action" both to stop discrimination and
to desegregate housing.
In Shannon v. HUD,8 8 the Third Circuit reviewed the "progression

in the thinking of Congress" with respect to the civil rights obligations
of federal agencies. 8 9 According to the court, the 1949 Housing Act
might have permitted the Secretary of HUD to "act neutrally on the issue

of racial segregation." 90 By 1968, however, with most federally subsidized housing still segregated, "Congress adopted § 3608 to require
HUD and other federal agencies to adopt a more aggressive approach in
the effort to end segregation in federally assisted housing."91
The Third Circuit's reasoning was endorsed in NAACP, Boston

Chapter v. HUD. In this case, the First Circuit explicitly rejected the
argument that §3608(e)(5) imposes "only an obligation not to discriminate," and that an agency violates Title VIII "only when [it] engages in
discriminatory conduct or when it funds a grantee who is engaged in
such discriminatory conduct with the purpose of furthering the grantee's
discrimination." 92 "The history of Title VIII," the court said, "suggests

that its framers meant to do more than simply restate HUD's existing
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 155.

87. Most courts that have considered the question have reached this conclusion. See, e.g.,
Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933 (2d Cir. 1988), aff'd in
part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (per curiam). See also SCHWEMM, supra note 74, at §10.4(1) (especially
notes 113.1 and 108.1, pp. 10-24 and 10-23, respectively).
88. 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
89. Id. at 816.
90. Id. at 816.
91. SCHWEMM, supra note 74, at 21-5. In a later case, the Third Circuit affirmed a district
court finding that legislative statements, including those of Senator Mondale, the primary sponsor
of the 1968 Act, "make it clear that Congress was well aware of governmental action contrary to
previous legislative prohibitions of racial discrimination in housing ....Therefore, in an effort to
end segregation .. . Congress enacted 3608(e)(5), requiring affirmative action .. .to cure this

widespread problem." Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1014-15 (E.D. Pa.
1976), affd as modified, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). See also

supra note 74, at § 21.2, 21-5 ("The history does show.., that § 3608 was seen as a
way of buttressing existing legal resources in order to mount a stronger attack on the widespread
problem of segregation in public housing.").
SCHWEMM,

92. NAACP, Boston Chapter, 817 F.2d at 154.
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legal obligations." 9 3 Furthermore, the First Circuit said, "as a matter of
language and of logic, a statute that instructs an agency 'affirmatively to
further' a national policy of nondiscrimination would seem to impose an
obligation to do more than simply not discriminate itself."94 Judge
Breyer, writing for the court, emphasized that Title VIII addressed not
only discrimination, but also segregation. The statute's "supporters," he
wrote, "saw the ending of discrimination as a means toward truly opening the nation's housing stock to persons of every race and creed."9 5
The First Circuit found in Title VIII "an intent that HUD do more than
simply not discriminate itself; it reflects the desire to have HUD use its
grant programs to assist in ending discrimination and segregation, to the
'
point where the supply of genuinely open housing increases. "96
The First Circuit held that § 3608 requires that the federal agency
must "consider [the] effect [of a grant] on the racial and socio-economic
composition of the surrounding area" and that "the need for such consideration itself implies, at a minimum, an obligation to assess negatively
those aspects of a proposed course of action that would further limit the
supply of genuinely open housing and to assess positively those aspects
of a proposed course of action that would increase that supply."9' 7
The First Circuit held HUD liable for "failure, over time, to take
seriously its minimal Title VIII obligation to evaluate alternative courses
of action in light of their effect upon open housing. 9 8 It held HUD
liable not for something it did but for not doing what it was obliged to
do, for accepting only cosmetic, ineffectual fair housing efforts by the
City of Boston and for not having "used... its immense leverage" under
the UDAG program "to provide adequate desegregated housing ....
The court said that the plaintiffs were claiming "the right to HUD's help
in achieving open housing,"' ° a right that the First Circuit held "was
01
viewed as important by the Congress that passed Title VII.' '
The obligations imposed on HUD by § 3608(e)(5) are imposed on
the Treasury by § 3608(d). Like HUD, the Treasury is required to use
its authority over the allocating agencies and the developers "to assist in
ending discrimination and segregation, to the point where the supply of
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. SCHWEMM, supra note 74, at § 21.1 pp. 21-4 (citing Clients Council v. Pierce, 711 F.2d
1406, 1425 (8th Cir. 1983)); see also Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1056 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
96. NAACP, Boston Chapter, 817 F.2d at 155.
97. Id. at 156.
98. Id. at 157.
99. Id. at 156.
100. Id. at 157.
101. SCHWEMM, supra note 74, at 21-25.
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genuinely open housing increases. '"102
B.

The Regulations' Explication of the Duty
"Affirmatively to Further" Title VIII

In addition to caselaw, HUD's regulations are a second source of
authority to define the Treasury's obligations under § 3608. HUD is the
agency to which Congress has assigned "authority and responsibility for
administering" Title VIII. 10 3 The Secretary of HUD is authorized to
make rules to "carry out" Title VIII. 1°4 HUD's administrative interpretation of the statute is "entitled to great weight."10 5 Moreover, a Treasury regulation provides that eligibility for the LIHTC requires that "the
unit is rented in a manner consistent with housing policy governing nondiscrimination, as evidenced by rules or regulations of the Department
The regulation provides:
of Housing and Urban Development ....
A residential rental unit is for use by the general public if the unit is
rented in a manner consistent with housing policy governing nondiscrimination, as evidenced by rules or regulations of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (24 C.F.R. subtitle
A and chapters I through XX). See HUD Handbook 4350.3 (or its
successor). A copy of HUD Handbook 4350.3 may be requested by
writing to: HUD, Directives Distribution Section, room B-100, 451
7th Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20410.107
102. NAACP, Boston Chapter, 817 F. 2d at 155.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (1994); see Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
107 (1979).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (1994).
105. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 204, 210 (1972); see Chevron, U.S.A.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984); NAACP v. American Family
Mutual Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 300-01 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 907 (1993)
(enforcing HUD's regulations because "courts should respect a plausible construction by an
agency to which Congress has delegated the power to make substantive rules"); SCHWEMM, supra
note 74, at § 7.2(4).
106. 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(a)(1998). The Treasury has explained this regulation as an
implementation of the "legislative history" of Section 42. In 1989, an IRS Notice said:
The legislative history of Section 42 ... provides that "Residential rental units must
be for use by the general public." ... Regulations will provide that the term "for
use by the general public" shall be determined in a manner consistent with HUD
housing policy governing nondiscrimination as evidenced by HUD rules and
Accordingly, owners of residential rental
regulations. See Handbook 4350.3 ....
units that give preferences to certain classes of tenants . . . will not violate the
general public use requirement if such preferences would not violate any policy
governing nondiscrimination expressed in the HUD handbook. [IRS Notice 89-6,
1989-1 C.B.625, 626-7 (1989)].
107. 59 Fed. Reg. 10067, 10073, 26 C.F.R. § 1.42-9(a) (1998). The Treasury regulation refers
to subtitle A and Chapters I through XX of 24 C.F.R. This comprises almost the entire 7 volumes
of title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Subtitle A alone is more than 800 pages long,
encompassing Parts 0-92. Chapters I through XX of Subtitle B include Parts 100 through 3500,
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The Treasury regulation is a welcome recognition of the pertinence
of fair housing law to the LIHTC program. The Treasury regulation
does, however, require improvement. It omits any reference to the governing statutes, including Title VIII. It refers only to "non-discrimination," not mentioning Title VIII's other purpose, to create "truly
integrated and balanced living patterns."' °8 Furthermore, it does not tai-

lor the HUD requirements specifically to the tax credit program.
The reference to the HUD handbook is problematic. The handbook
is long' 09 and replete with items not suitable to the LIHTC program."10
Moreover, since the handbook is not binding of its own force, it is
doubtful that the handbook assumes the force of law because it is
referred to in a regulation."'
Part IV draws on the caselaw, HUD regulations, and other standards to suggest changes to the Treasury's regulations to implement

more precisely the Department's obligations under Title VIII and the
LIHTC statute."I 2

almost 2 inches thick, consisting of hundreds of pages, not consecutively numbered, from Volume
1 to Volume 7 of title 24 of C.F.R.
The handbook is entitled "Occupancy Requirements of Subsidized Multifamily Housing
Programs." The Treasury regulation's instruction about how to secure the HUD handbook is not
effective. After making two such requests to no avail, the author of this article secured a copy of
the handbook only by making a personal request of a HUD deputy assistant secretary.
108. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Company, 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1995) (quoting the
remarks of Sen. Mondale, 114 Cong. Rec. 3422 (1968)).
109. It comprises some two inches of material, not cumulatively paginated.
110. The handbook does not list the LIHTC program as one to which any portion of the
handbook applies. See 1-2, "Programs Subject to this Handbook."
11l.See Chrysler v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Brown v. Lynn, 392 F. Supp. 559 (N.D. Ill.
1975).
112. The obligation of the Treasury and the state agencies to obey Title VIII would not be
affected by any reluctance on the part of developers to comply with these requirements. It is
worth noting, however, that the tax credit program is so popular with investors that there is no
reason to fear that the enforcement of these statutory requirements would reduce production of tax
credit developments. The NCSHA Report notes the "ferocious competition" for tax credit
allocations: the allocating agencies receive an average of $3 in applications for every $1 they
have to allocate. NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 3, 12. Indeed, NCSHA refers to "greater HFA
leverage" after 1994. Id. at 27.
Under Treasury regulation 1.42-9(a), developers are not entitled to tax credits if they are not
complying with the HUD rules or regulations "governing nondiscrimination." Therefore, many of
the suggestions that follow would only provide specific focus on obligations already imposed by
reference. The specificity and focus are important, however. Developers are required to comply
with all Treasury regulations in order to retain their tax credits, both under the federal program
and under any state tax credit program, as in California. When Treasury regulations are not clear,
developers risk losing their tax credits. Developers' best interests are served by clear Treasury
regulations that define as precisely as possible the obligations of developers-and housing credit
agencies-under the LIHTC program.

19981
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IV.

THE TREASURY'S OBLIGATIONS UNDER TITLE

VIII

AND THE TAX CREDIT STATUTE

The Treasury's obligations derive from the substantive provisions
of Title VIII, notably 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605, and 3608. The Treasury may not in any way "make unavailable" a dwelling to any person, or
discriminate with respect to terms, conditions, privileges, services, or
facilities, because of race, color, national origin, or other protected status . 113 The authoritative decisions hold that Title VIII is violated by
actions or omissions with disparate impact,1 14 and define such impact as
any action or omission that, among other tests, perpetuates segregation
in a community. 1 5 The Treasury, therefore, may not act or omit to act
when the act or omission has the effect of making housing unavailable to
minorities or perpetuating segregation in a community.
The Treasury's duty under § 3608 is "affirmatively to further" nondiscrimination and integration. Treasury must "use its grant programs to
assist in ending discrimination and segregation, to the point where the
supply of genuinely open housing increases.""16 Moreover, the Treasury's affirmative duty under § 3608 is to "consider [the] effect [of its
actions] on the racial and socio-economic composition of the surrounding area" and "to assess negatively those aspects of a proposed course of
action that would further limit the supply of genuinely open housing and
to assess positively those aspects of a proposed course of conduct that
11 7
would increase that supply.1
To satisfy these requirements, the Treasury should amend its regulations in at least three ways:
A. Treasury regulations should acknowledge the authority of Title
VIII, as well as HUD's Title VIII regulations, and the tax credit statute's
non-discrimination requirements;
B. Treasury regulations should specify what housing credit agencies must do to satisfy civil rights obligations; and
C. Treasury regulations should specify what tax credit developers
must do to satisfy civil rights obligations.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), (b), (f) (1994).
114. See Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1293 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) [Arlington Heights 11]; Huntington
Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), affid in part, 488 U.S.
15 (1988) (per curiam); see also SCHWEMM, supra note 74, § 10.4.
115. See Arlington Heights 11, 558 F.2d at 1288-91; Huntington, 844 F.2d at 937-38; see also
SCHWEMM, supra note 74, § 10.4(2)(c).
116. NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 817 F.2d 149,
155 (1st Cir. 1987) (regarding HUD).
117. Id. at 156.
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Treasury Regulations Should Acknowledge the Authority of Title
VIII, as well as HUD's Title VIII Regulations, and the Tax
Credit Statute's Non-DiscriminationRequirements

The Treasury should amend its LIHTC regulations to specify that
all housing provided under the LIHTC is subject to the provisions of
Title VIII as well as the HUD regulations implementing it. The LIHTC
regulations should be amended to direct that every housing credit agency
and every developer must comply not only with HUD regulations imple18
menting Title VIII, but also with the statute itself.'
The Treasury regulations should explain that their authority is not
simply legislative history requiring that LIHTC units be "for use by the
general public," but also Title VIII, and the Treasury's statutory obligation "affirmatively to further" the purposes of Title VIII.
The restatement of the statutory obligation is a common provision
in regulations, even when a regulation implements one discrete statute.
This restatement does not change or add anything to the state of the law,
but could have a considerable practical effect, especially for the LIHTC
regulation and the Title VIII obligations. Since the obligations come
from an entirely different statute, it is likely that many people who are
experts about § 42 of the Internal Revenue Code are not familiar with
the provisions of Title VIII. The Treasury regulations should clarify
both the obligation itself and the fact that a developer's failure to comply
with Title VIII is a basis for loss of the tax credit. The Treasury's obligation "affirmatively to further the purposes" of Title VIII includes the
obligation to state that Title VIII applies to the LIHTC program." 9
Treasury regulations also should define as a prohibited discriminatory act any "refusal to lease" a tax credit unit to a Section 8 certificate
or voucher holder "because of the status of the prospective tenant as
such a holder." This would implement 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(B)(iv),
which provides that no credit shall be allowed absent an agreement
between the taxpayer and the housing credit agency which prohibits
such a refusal to lease to a Section 8 certificate or voucher holder. The
20
statutory requirement should be incorporated in the regulation.1
118. This article focuses on the Treasury's obligations under Title VIII, which generally
includes obligations imposed by Title VI. See supra note 81. The article does not consider
obligations that may be imposed by Title VI alone. The current Treasury regulation makes
HUD's Title VI regulations-and HUD regulations issued under all civil rights laws-applicable
to determine eligibility for the tax credit. When the Treasury revises its regulations, it should
consider the applicability of the other statutes, and their implementing regulations, as well as Title
VIII and the Title VIiI regulations, which last is all that this article considers.
119. See Barrios, supra note 24, at 23 (the first of the Treasury's violations of Title VIII is "the
failure of the Service to explicitly state its commitment to the Fair Housing Act").
120. Although 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(B)(iv) was added to the IRC in 1993 (P.L. 103-669 (H.R.
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Treasury regulations also should acknowledge and re-state the
Treasury's own obligations under Title VIII, including its affirmative
obligation to further the purposes of Title VIII. Details of this obligation

are discussed in the following sections.
B.

Treasury Regulations Should Specify What Housing Credit
Agencies Themselves Must Do to Satisfy
Civil Rights Obligations

The Treasury's requirements for the housing credit agencies should

address both general housing credit agency activities and, in particular,
how housing credit agencies are to take civil rights concerns into
account in allocating the tax credit.

1.

THE GENERAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE HOUSING CREDIT AGENCIES

a. Treasury regulations should require that the housing credit agencies certify that they are in compliance with Title VIII and the HUD
regulations, and that they will affirmatively further the purposes of Title
VIII. Such certifications are not unusual: they are required now of state

and local government agencies that receive funding under other
programs. 121
b. The IRC requires allocating agencies to define their housing priorities, but gives little guidance as to how to achieve this.1 22 Treasury
regulations should require that non-discrimination and desegregation be
clearly identified as priority goals for the housing credit agencies.

Agencies identify housing needs primarily in terms of existing problems
and populations to be served. 2 3 Discrimination and segregation are not
identified as existing problems.1 24 The LIHTC program will not solve
2264, 107 Stat. 312)), a 1996 study reported that 11% of the surveyed tax credit developments in
Washington State revealed that they do not accept Section 8 tenants. WASH. REPORT, supra note
22, at 2.-3.
121. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 91.325(a)(1) (1998). "Each State is required to submit a
certification that it will affirmatively further fair housing, which means that it will conduct an
analysis to identify impediments to fair housing choice within the State, take appropriate actions
to overcome the effects of any impediments .... and maintain records reflecting the analysis and
actions." See also 24 C.F.R. § 91.225(a)(1) (1998) (imposing the same requirement for local
governments). Moreover, Executive Order 12892 directs that "the head of each executive agency
shall ... require that all persons or other entities who are applicants for, or participants in, or who
are supervised or regulated under, agency programs and activities relating to housing . . . shall
comply with this order." 3 C.F.R. 849 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994).
122. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 55-56.
123. Id. at 56. Most states now define their housing priorities for the LIHTC program by
reference to the consolidated plans that HUD requires for several of its programs, including
CDBG and the HOME Investment Partnership programs. Id. at 55.
124.
The most frequently cited problems were excessive rent burdens (89 percent),
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the problems of discrimination and segregation unless the agency identifies them as issues requiring attention and solution. Each state may
define discrimination and segregation issues differently, but the Treasury
should require at a minimum that each state credit agency address the
problems. 125
c. Treasury regulations should require that housing credit agencies
establish procedures for enforcing the prohibition against discrimination
on the basis of §8 status. These agencies must advise LIHTC occupants

and potential occupants of this prohibition; in addition, the agencies
must provide a complaint mechanism for enforcing the prohibition. The
agency also must advise LIHTC occupants and potential occupants of
both Title VIII's protections and the ways in which the protections are
enforced.

d. Treasury regulations should require that the housing credit agencies assess and oversee the implementation of developers' affirmative
marketing plans. These plans must address both initial rent-up and filling vacancies to encourage unsegregated occupancy of tax credit
12 6

developments.

followed by substandard housing (72 percent), a lack of housing (59 percent),
deteriorated neighborhood (52 percent), and excessive concentrations of very lowincome housing (30 percent). Translated into solutions, these include needs for less
expensive housing, community revitalization, and mixed-income development.
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 56. Seventy-eight percent of the agencies also identified strong
need for subsidized housing in rural areas. "The populations most frequently identified as needing
housing were the elderly (70 percent); and persons with special needs, including those who are
handicapped, disabled, or homeless or have AIDS (63 percent)." Id. at 56.
Agencies could use the consolidated plan to identify civil rights concerns. The goals of the
consolidated plan, as defined by HUD, include increasing the availability of decent housing "particularly to... disadvantaged minorities without discrimination" and other civil rights objectives.
24 C.F.R. § 91.1(a)(1)(i)-(iii) (1998). The consolidated plan must specifically assess whether
"any racial or ethnic group has disproportionately greater need." 24 C.F.R. § 91.205(b)(2) (1998).
Further, it "must identify ... any areas ... with concentrations of racial/ethnic minorities." 24
C.F.R. § 91.210(a) (1998). See also 24 C.F.R. § 91.315(k) (1998) (noting that the consolidated
plan must describe the strategy to coordinate the LIHTC with development of housing affordable
to low- and moderate-income persons). Integration of the tax credit program into a coordinated
state housing strategy would be very salutary. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Urban Housing: A
Strategic Role for the States, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 117 (1994) (urging coordinated state
housing strategy incorporating LIHTC and mortgage revenue bond financing).
125. At least one state housing credit agency-Michigan's-now acknowledges an obligation
to promote fair housing. Michigan Housing Development Authority 1998 QAP at 9 ("The Fair
Housing Act piohibits discrimination in the sale, rental, financing, or other services related to
housing on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.
Under the act, the Authority has a duty to administer programs which affirmatively advance fair
housing.") Connecticut's Housing Finance Authority implicitly acknowledges such an obligation
by imposing on developers the "threshold" requirement that they "must be committed to undertake
strong affirmative measures to ensure that the activity funded promotes regional economic, social
and racial integration and the integration of persons with disabilities." Connecticut Housing
Finance Authority Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program 8 (QAP 1998).
126. "Affirmative marketing" is "the energetic effort to break down racial barriers, [not] create
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The HUD regulations, which the Treasury has made applicable to
the tax credit program, require that HUD-assisted housing be marketed
"affirmatively as to achieve a condition in which individuals of similar
income levels in the same housing market area have a like range of
housing choices available to them regardless of race, color, religion, sex,
'
handicap, familial status or national origin." 127
LIHTC projects with
Department of Agriculture or HUD assistance expressly are required to

pursue affirmative fair housing marketing. 128 State housing finance
agencies that participate in the risk-sharing program for insured multifamily project loans must review and approve Affirmative Fair Housing
Marketing Plans ("AFHMPs"). 219 Several state agencies have expressly

imposed on all tax credit developers an obligation to develop and implement affirmative fair housing marketing plans.1 30 The Treasury should
new ones;" it requires "aggressive public relations work espousing the principle of neutral equality
of opportunity." Smolla, supra note 82, at 1005-06. See also Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of
Affirmative Action, 1998 Wis. L. REV. - (forthcoming 1998).
127. 24 C.F.R. § 200.610 (1998). Each HUD-assisted housing provider is required to "pursue
affirmative fair housing marketing policies in soliciting buyers and tenants, in determining their
eligibility, and in concluding sales and rental transactions." Id. See generally 24 C.F.R. Part 200
SubPart M (200.600 et seq.) (1998); 24 C.F.R. Part 108 (1998) (Compliance Procedures for
Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing); 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-la(d)(9) (1994) (AFHMP for troubled
multi-family housing projects.
128. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1901.203 (Dept. of Agriculture), 1944.164 (farm labor housing) (1998); 7
C.F.R. § 1944 266 (congregate housing); 24 C.F.R. §§ 280.25(a) (1998) (Nehemiah), 572.405(b)
(HOPE 3), 700.175(d)(2) (1998) (congregate housing), 850.151(g) (1998) (§8/§202),
880.601(a)(2) (1998) (§ 8 New Construction) 884.214(a) (§ 8/515); 886.105(f) (HUD-insured and
HUD-held mortgages), 886.313(b) (disposition); 886.321(a) (same), (b) (same), 891.155(a)
(elderly & handicapped), 891.400(a)(2) (same), 891.600(a)(2) (same), 891.740(a)(2) (non-elderly
handicapped), 904.104(a)(2) (turnkey), 906.20 (homeownership) (1998).
129. 24 C.F.R. §§ 266.215(a) (1998), 266.300(b)(4) (1998), 266.305(b)(4) (1998),
266.420(b)(7) (1998), 266.505(b)(8) (1998).
130. See, e.g., the 1998 QAPs for Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey.
Connecticut has a general requirement that each sponsor "must agree to comply with all
affirmative fair marketing . . . requirements." Conn. Housing Finance Authority, Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit Program QAP 8 (1998). New Jersey is a touch more specific:
NJHMFA encourages all owners/developers to affirmatively market their projects.
For projects over 25 units, applicants shall submit an Affirmative Fair Housing
Marketing Plan, which, in short, documents how the project will be marketed to
those people who are least likely to apply. For instance, if the proposed
development is located in an area predominantly populated by Caucasians, outreach
should be directed to non-Caucasians. Conversely, if the population is
predominantly African American, outreach should be directed to non-African
American groups. At the time the units are placed in service, the developer and
rental agent shall certify that the project was affirmatively marketed.
N.J. Housing & Mortgage Finance Agency 21 (QAP Draft 1998).
[Massachusetts] requires developers to establish affirmative action goals for the percent of minority participation in each project. Developers and management agents
must establish effective marketing plans to reach the identified minority groups.
If a tax credit project is located in a predominantly white neighborhood in the
City of Boston . . . the affirmative fair marketing plan shall have the percentage
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expressly require that all credit agencies do so.
Many of the requirements imposed by the HUD regulation easily
apply to the LIHTC program. This includes requirements that there be
an affirmative fair housing marketing plan available for public inspection, "31
' that developers prominently display an approved Fair Housing
poster that includes an approved Equal Housing Opportunity logo or slogan, 32 that developers "instruct all employees and agents in writing and
orally on the policy of nondiscrimination and fair housing,"' 1 33 that all
goals for occupancy of the low income units which reflect the racial composition of
the City of Boston as determined in the most recent U.S. Census. As of the date of
the issuance of this allocation plan, these percentages are as follows:
59.0% White
12.8% Black
10.8% Hispanic
.3% Native American
5.2% Asian/Pacific Island
1.0% Other.
Mass. Dept. of Housing & Community Dev. 38-39 (QAP February 1998 Draft).
Michigan provides that
[a]pplications that include a formal Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Plan may
be eligible to receive points. This plan is designed to assure that persons who are
members of racial or ethnic groups (who would not otherwise apply for occupancy
in a housing project because of existing neighborhood racial or ethnic patterns, site
locations, or other factors) are made aware of the available housing, feel welcome to
apply for the housing, and have the opportunity to rent the housing.
The Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Plan (AFHMP) shall at a minimum
address the following issues:
" Identification of the target population (racial or ethnic group(s)) least likely to
apply to the project within the market area.
* Identification of concrete and credible outreach efforts including a budget
designed to carry out the AFHMP.
" Identification of what positions within the management company will carry the
responsibility to implement the AFHMP.
* Description of the level of minority employment within the management agency,
and what are the company's fair housing, equal employment policies.
* Description of what the management company's previous experience has been in
implementing AFHMPs....
An application can earn up to 5 points for such a plan. State of Michigan QAP 9 (1998).
The State of Washington requires an affirmative marketing plan that "must contain explicit
assurances" that, among other things, "the project will seek to have a resident population that
represents the diversity of the local community." Wash. State Hsg. Finance Cmsn. LIHTC Program Guidelines 98-99 (Rev. Feb. 28, 1997).
It is noteworthy that even agencies that do not require affirmative marketing of units do
require or encourage setasides for minority- or women-owned businesses. See, e.g., Alabama
QAP 16 (QAP Draft 1997).
131. 24 C.F.R. § 200.625 (1998). The HUD regulation provides for HUD approval. The
Treasury and HUD might agree that HUD should assume responsibility for approving the AFHM
plans of tax credit sponsors and for assuring compliance with AFHM plans under 24 C.F.R. Part
108 (1998).
132. 24 C.F.R. § 200.620(e) and (f) (1998).
133. 24 C.F.R. § 200.620(c) (1998).
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advertising include Equal Housing Opportunity statements and, if persons are depicted, the advertisement must depict "persons of majority
and minority groups, including both sexes,"' 134 and that the owner
"maintain a nondiscriminatory housing policy in recruiting from both
minority and majority groups, including both sexes and the handicapped,
for staff engaged in the sale or rental of properties." 3 '
Two provisions of the HUD regulations would require adjustment
for the LIHTC program. Section 200.620(a) requires that the owner
"specifically solicit eligible . . . tenants" referred by a HUD area or
insuring office. While such persons are entitled to equal consideration
by a tax credit sponsor, there is no particular reason to justify a requirement that such persons be "specifically solicit[ed]."
Also, one sentence of § 200.620(a) seems inappropriate for tax
credit developments; indeed, it seems inappropriate for the HUD-FHA
developments to which it applies. The sentence specifies that an
AFHMP "shall typically involve publicizing [availability of units] to
minority persons... through... minority publications or other minority
[media] outlets . .

. ."

This requirement is based on the assumption that

the development is located in a non-minority neighborhood.
The information available suggests, however, that this assumption
is not very accurate for either the FHA or tax credit projects. As 34% of
the tax credit units are in areas with more than 50% minority populations, and some additional units are in tracts with substantial (but less
than 50%) minority population, a special emphasis on attracting minority residents would be peculiarly inappropriate; indeed, probably unlawful. Further, because the tax credit statute favors sites in minority
neighborhoods, the duty to promote integration would require that for
those projects an affirmative effort be made to market the projects to
persons not of those minority groups. The more appropriate standard
would require affirmative marketing to those persons not likely to apply
without special attention.
The AFHM plans alone, however, will not achieve desegregated
housing. These plans have not been successful for the HUD programs,
and there is no reason to believe that the plans will be any more successful for the LIHTC program. The HUD AFHM regulations not only are
weak, but also have not been enforced. 136 The Treasury should, therefore, strengthen the HUD AFHM regulations, and require housing credit
134. 24 C.F.R. § 200.620(a) (1998).
135. 24 C.F.R. § 200.620(b) (1998).
136. See Laura Lazarus, Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Regulations: HUD's Failed
Attempt to Implement a Good Idea (Geo. U. L. Ctr. seminar paper, 1993, on file with the author)
(reviewing HUD and independent studies that "confirm that the regulations have had minimal
impact on opening up housing opportunities" (Id. at 47); John M. Goering, Introduction, Racial
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agencies to establish procedures for the enforcement of these requirements.137 As part of the improvement, the Treasury should require that
the housing developers specifically and regularly invite applications
from all those on waiting lists for subsidized housing and any housing
1 38
mobility programs.
e. Treasury regulations should require that the housing credit agen-

cies collect, assess, and report information about the racial, ethnic, and
other protected statuses of residents of LIHTC developments.
LIHTC developers now are obligated to collect and maintain such

data. This is explicitly required of the LIHTC projects that have Department of Agriculture139 or HUD assistance. 14 0 LIHTC developments that
Desegregation and FederalHousing Policies, in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY
202 (John M. Goering ed. 1986).
137. For suggestions about improvements, see Laura Lazarus, supra note 136, and the studies

on which it is based: LEONARD S. RUBINOWrrz ET AL., AFFIRMATIVE MARKETING OF FEDERALLY
ASSISTED HOUSING: IMPLEMENTATION IN THE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA (Study by the
Urban-Suburban Investment Study Group, 1974); HUD OFFICE OF FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MULTIFAMILY AFFIRMATIVE FAIR HOUSING MARKETING
PROGRAM (1990); HUD OFFICE OF FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, AN ASSESSMENT OF
THE AFFIRMATIVE MARKETING REVIEW PROCESS ON THE RENTAL REHABILITATION PROGRAM
(1985); OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE

AFFIRMATIVE FAIR HOUSING MARKETING PLAN (1982). Improved AFHMP regulations would
recognize that not all residents are either black or white; in fact, there are different groups of
minorities.
138. There are now 54 assisted housing mobility programs in 33 different metropolitan areas;
these offer an excellent opportunity to desegregate by race, ethnicity, and economics. MARGERY
AUSTIN TURNER & KALE WILLIAMS, HOUSING MOBILITY: REALIZING THE PROMISE at 2 (1998)
(Report from the Second National Conference on Assisted Housing Mobility).
139. Thirty-five percent of LIHTC projects (26% of LIHTC units) are financed by the
Department of Agriculture. ABT REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-5. This may understate such
financing. Id. at 2-9. Many LIHTC projects also have CDBG, HOPE, HOME, or other HUD
funding. See supra note 24. Developers of these projects are required to collect racial and ethnic
data about applicants and beneficiaries. See also 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(2)(a) (1994) (Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development required to collect and report such data at least annually); 42
U.S.C. § 3608(a) (1996) (same; Sec. of Agriculture as well); 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.5(b), 1901.202 (g),
1944.266 (1997). In 1994, what had been the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) in the U.S.
Department of Agriculture was eliminated, and its functions transferred to the Rural Housing and
Community Development Service (RHCDS). USDA, Secretary's Memorandum 1010-1 (Oct. 20,
1994). See NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT RHCDS (FmHA) Housing Programs: Tenants'
and Purchasers' Rights §1.3 (2d ed. 1995).
140. Sponsors must maintain current data on the race and ethnicity of applicants for and
beneficiaries of HUD programs. See 24 C.F.R. § 1.61(b) (1998) (Title VI enforcement); 24
C.F.R. § (7)(i)(A) (1997) (HOME program); 24 C.F.R. § 107.30(a) (1998) (E.O. 11063); 24
C.F.R. § 202.12(8) (1998) (mortgage & loan insurance programs); 24 C.F.R. § 202.20(h) (1998)
(mortgage and loan insurance programs; 24 C.F.R. § 280.25(a)(2) (1998) (Nehemiah program); 24
C.F.R. § 291.440 (1998) (single-family disposition); 24 C.F.R. § 511.73(a) (1998) (Rental
Rehabilitation); 24 C.F.R. § 570.490(a) (1998) (CDBG); 24 C.F.R. § 570.506(g)(2) (1998)
(same); 24 C.F.R. § 572.405(c) (1998) (HOPE 3); 24 C.F.R. § 574.425(b) (1998) (same); 24
C.F.R. § 574.500(b)(4) (1998) (HOPWA); 24 C.F.R. § 700.175(d)(3) (1998) (congregate
housing); 24 C.F.R. § 880.603(b)(3) (1998); (202/§ 8); 24 C.F.R. § 881.603 (1998); 24 C.F.R.
§ 882.406(f(3) (1998) (Section 8 Mod. Rehab); 24 C.F.R. § 882.514(a)(3) (1998) (same); 24
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do not have Agriculture or HUD assistance are bound to collect and
maintain such information because the Treasury has made compliance

with the HUD regulations a condition of eligibility for the tax credit.
f. Treasury regulations should require that the housing credit agencies train developers about their civil rights obligations, 4 1 monitor
developers' compliance with those obligations, 4 2 and act to promote
unsegregated occupancy of tax credit developments.

Since the housing credit agencies themselves have an obligation
C.F.R. § 884.214(b)(5) (1998) (§ 515 § 8); 24 C.F.R. § 886.321(b)(5) (1997) (Section 8
disposition of HUD-owned projects); 24 C.F.R. § 891.410(f) (1997) (Supportive Housing); 24
C.F.R. § 891.610(f) (1998) (§ 202/ Section 8); 24 C.F.R. § 891.750(b)(4) (1997) (non-elderly
handicapped); 24 C.F.R. §950.3011(d)(1) (1997) (Indian Housing/FSS); 24 C.F.R.
§ 982.158(f)(1) (1998) (Section 8 existing); 24 C.F.R. § 984.201(d)(1) (1997) (Section 8/FSS).
See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608(e)(2)(a), (e)(6) (1994) (Secretary of HUD required to collect and
report such data at least annually).
Similar requirements are imposed, under Title VI, on most federal agencies. See 15 C.F.R.
§ 8.7(b) (1998) (Commerce); 22 C.F.R. § 141.5(b) (1998) (State); 28 C.F.R. § 42.106(b) (1998)
(Justice); 29 C.F.R. § 31.5(b) (1998) (Labor); 32 C.F.R. § 195.7(b) (1998) (Defense); 34 C.F.R.
§ 100.6(b) (1998) (Education); 38 C.F.R. § 18.6(b) (1998) (Veterans Affairs); 40 C.F.R.
§ 7.85(a)(2) (1998) (EPA), 43 C.F.R. § 17.5(b) (1998) (Interior); 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(b) (1998)
(HHS); 45 C.F.R. § 1203.6(b) (1998) (Corporation for National and Community Service); 49
C.F.R. § 21.9(b) (1998) (Transportation).
141. GAO states that, even without IRS requirements,
45 allocating agencies reported that they either provide project owners and
managers with optional training on compliance or require such training. Forty-eight
allocating agencies also provided compliance manuals that set out tax rules with
which a project must comply. All allocating agencies reported providing either
manuals or training, or both, to project owners and managers.
GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 107. This should include civil rights requirements.
142. Wisely, the LIHTC program does not rest on data collection and certifications; the statute
includes a requirement that the housing credit agencies actively monitor the developers. Credit
agencies are required to review all of the certifications made by the owners to determine that there
is compliance with the requirements of the tax credit program. In addition, credit agencies must
establish a review procedure that contains at least one "of [three monitoring] requirements."
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 12, at 75-76. Agencies may engage outside contractors and may charge
compliance monitoring fees to be paid by the owners of tax credit properties. Id. at 74. "[T]here
are five key aspects of the monitoring requirement: record keeping and record retention;
certification; review of submitted documents or on-site review; the right to conduct an in-depth
inspection; and notification of non-compliance." Id. Under 26 U.S.C. § 42(l)(3), the state
agencies are required to submit annual reports. State agencies must report buildings in
noncompliance to the Service. That the current compliance monitoring requirements are not
adequate has been recognized by the National Council of State Housing Agencies, the
organization of agencies that administer the LIHTC program, NCSHA's June 1992 Standards for
State Tax Credit Administration acknowledge that "IRS compliance monitoring rules are
inadequate to prevent the abuse and physical deterioration that have plagued many subsidized
housing projects and to ensure that the projects continue to benefit low income tenants." NCSHA
Standards of State Tax Credit Administration, reproduced in GUGGENHEIM, supra note 12,
Appendix 29 at 346, 353. NCSHA recommends enhanced monitoring. This monitoring should be
extended to the civil rights requirements.
These are the minimum requirements; housing credit agencies "can adopt stricter monitoring
requirements or procedures if they wish." GUGGENHEIM, supra note 12, at 74.
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"affirmatively to further" fair housing, they must do more than mandate
processes (such as affirmative marketing plans and linkages to public
housing, Section 8, and mobility programs). The housing credit agencies must also train and monitor the developers to be sure that the
processes are being followed and to determine whether the methods are
resulting in desegregated occupancy. The developers' annual reports on
occupancy must be reviewed to determine which developments might
warrant additional attention. This monitoring must include fair housing
audits, to assure non-discrimination under Title VIII and for Section 8
certificate and voucher holders.' 4 3 When the audits or occupancy data
suggest a possible civil rights violation, the housing credit agency must
refer the matter to the Treasury and to HUD's Office of Fair Housing
and Equal Opportunity."'
Treasury regulations also should require the housing credit agencies
to maintain a database of all LIHTC units. There should be a single site
at which potential renters and agencies assisting potential renters can
learn of LIHTC housing opportunities.' 4 5 The housing credit agencies
themselves should establish liasons with public housing, Section 8, and
mobility programs affirmatively to promote the integration of subsidized
tenants in tax credit developments. 4 6 In some circumstances, it may be
appropriate for the agency to establish specific goals for integrated
143. Random auditing should be performed by contract with a fair housing group experienced
in the use of testing. See Veronica M. Reed, Fair Housing Enforcement: Is the Current System
Adequate?, in RESIDENTIAL APARTHEID: THE AMERICAN LEGACY 222-23 (Robert D. Bullard et al.
eds., 1994). (Compare the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which has an "apparently
respectable history in the area of monitoring banks for compliance with the Fair Housing Act."
Jones v. Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, 983 F. Supp. 197, 204 (D.D.C. 1997). OCC has
"developed guidelines for detecting unlawful discriminatory practices ... by national banks" and
"conducts periodic examinations of all institutions that it supervises . . . to determine whether
unlawful discrimination has occurred."Id. at 204 n.10. The OCC uses "matched pair testing to
detect possible lending discrimination at the preapplication stage of the credit process and has
encouraged self-testing by national banks." Id.
144. I am indebted to Joseph Guggenheim for the suggestion that monitoring results be
reported to HUD. Referrals to the Department of Justice and the Civil Rights Commission may
also be appropriate. Such outcome-oriented regulation has been praised by the NCSHA Report as
one of the great virtues of the LIHTC program. See NCSHA REPORT, supra note 2, at 59 ("Many
HUD programs use process-oriented regulation, where the owner/manager is judged on adherence
to a specific protocol rather than achievement of desired objectives. By contrast, the Housing
Credit specifies outcomes. . . . The result is better compliance with less of an administrative
burden on both the regulated and the regulations.").
145. The difficulty of finding out about housing opportunities can be especially frustrating for
minority, lower-income, and Section 8 tenants. See Fred Freiberg, Promoting Residential
Integration: The Role of Private FairHousing Groups, in HOUSING MARKETS AND RESIDENTIAL
MOBILITY 231 (G. Thomas Kingsley & Margery Austin Turner eds., 1993).
146. In Wisconsin, for example, up to 15% of the state's tax credit allocation was designated
for projects certified by a housing counseling and recruitment center. Id. at 231 (describing
settlement of metropolitan school desegregation case). See also Florence Wagman Roisman, The
Role of the State, The Necessity of Race-Conscious Remedies, and Other Lessons From the
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occupancy.147
2.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE HOUSING CREDIT AGENCIES IN
ALLOCATING TAX CREDITS

a. Treasury regulations should require housing credit agencies to
disqualify developers who have violated fair housing laws. An applica-

tion should be absolutely rejected if any of the following is found:
1. There is a pending civil rights suit against the applicant instituted by the Department of Justice.

2. There is an outstanding finding of noncompliance with any civil
rights statute, Executive Order, or regulation as a result of formal admin-

istrative proceedings, unless the applicant is operating under a HUD
approved compliance agreement designed to correct the area of noncompliance, or is currently negotiating such an agreement with HUD.
3. There is an unresolved Secretarial charge of discrimination
against the applicant issued under section 810(g) of the Fair Housing

Act, as implemented by 24 C.F.R. § 103.400.
4. There has been an adjudication of a civil rights violation in a
civil action brought against the applicant by a private individual, unless
the applicant is operating in compliance with a court order designed to
has discharged any
applicant
correct the area of noncompliance, or the 14
8
responsibility arising from such litigation.
SETON HALL L. REV. 101, 129-30 (1997) (recommending coordination
of New Jersey's LIHTC program with the Mount Laurel and state subsidy programs).
147. Occupancy goals are appropriate where a history of past discrimination has been shown.
The Massachusetts occupancy goals (see supra note 130) presumably are derived from the consent
decree in NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361, 371-72 (D. Mass. 1989), which
requires that all Boston area HUD affirmative fair housing marketing plans shall have as their goal
and measure of success the achievement of "a racial composition in HUD-assisted housing located
in neighborhoods which are predominantly white, which reflects the racial composition of the City
[of Boston] as a whole." See Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
44 (1998) (discussing the consent decree and upholding the use of the AFHMP even against a
claim of preference by urban renewal displacees). The Massachusetts QAP represents an
extension of the remedy to the state's use of other federal programs. This is justifiable in terms of
the state's own responsibility for past discrimination. See U.S. v. City of Yonkers, 96 F.3d 600,
621-23 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2479 (1997) (mem.) (state liability for housing
segregation); U.S. v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 992 F. Supp. 672, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("unremitting
failure on the part of the [state agency] to remedy the segregative condition in the [city] housing
market to which the [state agency] contributed" and the indivisibility of the federal responsibility).
Occupancy goals also may be appropriate to achieve the "compelling interest" of residential
desegregation. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111 (1979) (" 'there
can be no question about the importance' to a community of 'promoting stable, racially integrated
housing.'"). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994), discussed supra at 614-15. For the "compelling
interest" in desegregating housing, see supra, notes 5 and 6.
148. These are the standards that govern HUD's selection of applicants for funding under the
HOPE VI program. See 62 Fed. Reg. 18242, 18248 (April 14, 1997). I am indebted to Richard
Gervase for calling them to my attention and suggesting their pertinence to tax credit applications.

Mount Laurel Study, 127
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In considering applications for allocations of the tax credit, housing
credit agencies should review developers' submissions and should
request reviews by HUD's Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, and
by State and local fair housing enforcement agencies.
b. Treasury regulations should mandate the housing credit agencies
to establish as a threshold requirement that each project "affirmatively
further" fair housing. The Treasury should require that each housing
credit agency map all of its existing LIHTC projects, noting the racial,
ethnic, and economic characteristics of each location and of the residents
at each location.' 49 Against that background, the Treasury should
require the agency to assess each application to determine the extent to
which the new proposal "affirmatively furthers" fair housing.
Treasury regulations should require the housing credit agencies to
assure that equivalent facilities and services are being offered to different groups of residents, e.g., that new construction as well as rehabilitation is available in minority neighborhoods and that multi-bedroom units
are generally available.
The Treasury may elect to exercise considerable discretion, or to
allow the housing credit agencies to exercise considerable discretion, in
defining what "affirmatively furthering fair housing" means with respect
to site selection. The current standard, developed by caselaw and
embodied in HUD's regulations, is that "the site must not be located in
an area of minority concentration" unless certain exceptions have been
satisfied.1 50 This standard has been variously criticized both for depriv149. The mapping would be facilitated by the geo-coded database established by HUD.
150. See 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(b) (1998) (public housing). A site for new construction must not

be located in an "area of minority concentration" or "a racially mixed area if the project will cause
a significant increase in the proportion of minority to non-minority residents in the area." 24
C.F.R. § 941.202(c)(1)-(2) (1998). The exceptions are provided in § 941.202(c)(1)(i) (1998): the

prohibition against construction in an area of minority concentration applies
unless (A) sufficient, comparable opportunities exist for housing for minority
families, in the income range to be served by the proposed project, outside areas of

minority concentration, or (B) the project is necessary to meet overriding housing
needs which cannot otherwise feasibly be met in that housing market area. An

"overriding need" may not serve as the basis for determining that a site is acceptable

if the only reason the need cannot otherwise feasibly be met is that discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, creed, sex, or national origin renders sites
outside areas of minority concentration unavailable.
24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c)(1)(1) (1998). The site also "must promote greater choice of housing
opportunities and avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons." 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(d) (1998).
Similar standards are imposed for Supportive Housing for the Elderly and Persons with Disa-

bilities (24 C.F.R. §891.125) (1997) and for the Section 8 Project-Based Certificate Program (24
C.F.R. §983.6). No "statute, regulation, or policy ... defines 'area of minority concentration' or
'racially mixed area.'" Glendale Neighborhood Ass'n v. Greensboro Hous. Auth., 956 F. Supp.
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ing minority areas of housing 51 and for allowing the exceptions to swallow the rule, so that assisted housing continues to be sited in minority
52
areas. 1
It seems clear, however, that site selection has not been effected in

accordance with this standard. Housing credit agencies do not refer to
the standard in their QAPs, and do not invite developers to address the
question of the exceptions to the standard. The ABT, GAO and NCSHA

reports all indicate that a substantial percentage of the tax credit units are
in fact in areas of minority concentration. There may be reasons why, in
particular circumstances, tax credit developments should be sited in

areas of minority concentration. Professors Calmore and Adams make
powerful arguments for improving housing in those areas.153 Moreover,
it is sometimes possible that a site in a minority concentrated area may
attract non-minority as well as minority residents.' 54 Furthermore, the

tax credit statute itself encourages developers to apply for allocations for
qualified census tracts and difficult development areas, which are likely

to be areas of minority concentration. Such siting may be justifiable, but
it should not be effected without any consideration of the harm that may
result from it and alternatives that might do more to encourage residential integration.
The Treasury does not need to adhere to one fixed rule to govern
these choices in all circumstances. But the Treasury must establish the
requirement that housing credit agencies take this fundamental issue into
account when making allocation decisions. The Treasury may not stand
silent and allow the housing credit agencies to allocate billions of dollars

in federal financing without considering the fair housing implications of
these allocations.
The caselaw which has interpreted HUD's § 3608 duties clearly
1270, 1280 (M.D.N.C. 1996). For a history of the standards, see Michael Vernarelli, Where
Should HUD Locate Assisted Housing?: The Evolution of Fair Housing Policy, in HousING
DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY 214-234 (John M. Goering ed., 1986).
151. See John 0. Calmore, Fair Housing vs. Fair Housing: The Problems with Providing
Increased Housing Opportunities Through Spatial Deconcentration, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7
(1980) (deleterious impact of HUD's regulations on minority communities).
152. See Roisman, Intentional Racial Discrimination, supra note 5, 143 U. PA. L. REV. at
1371; Philip D. Tegler, Housing Segregation and Local Discretion, 3 BKLYN. J. OF L. & POLICY
209, 225-27 (1994).
153. See Calmore, supra note 151; John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner
Commission Report: A Back-to-The Future Essay, 71 N.C.L. REV. 1487 (1993); John 0.
Calmore, To Make Wrong Right: The Necessary and ProperAspirations of FairHousing, in THE
STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 1989 (National Urban League; Janet DeWart, ed.) 77; Michelle
Adams, supra note 5.
154. See, e.g., Martha Mahoney, Law and Social Geography: Public Housing and the
Economy in New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1251, 1289 (1990) (describing public housing
projects on valuable land, close to downtown New Orleans).
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requires that the Treasury, too, must have an institutionalized method of
taking into account the racial and economic characteristics of the neighborhood and a set of standards for deciding which sites are preferable, to
satisfy the Treasury's obligation affirmatively to promote racial and eth155
nic integration as well as to eschew discrimination.
The initial statement of the duty to collect and consider such information was announced by the Third Circuit in 1970 in Shannon v.
HUD.156 Shannon held that under the national housing policy and the
Fair Housing Act, the federal "[a]gency must utilize some institutionalized method whereby, in considering site selection . . . , it has before it
the relevant racial and socio-economic information necessary . . .to
make an informed decision on the effects of site selection ... on racial
concentration."' 15 7 Several courts of appeals have agreed with Shannon's statement of HUD's duty to take racial, ethnic, and economic segregation into account, 158 and have upheld HUD's regulations as
155. The courts recognize that the agency is not always obligated to prefer desegregation:
"there will be instances where a pressing case may be made for the rebuilding of a racial ghetto."
Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 804, 822 (3d Cir. 1970). What the courts do require is "that the
agency's judgment must be an informed one; one which weighs the alternatives and finds that the
need for physical rehabilitation or additional minority housing at the site in question clearly
outweighs the disadvantage of increasing or perpetuating racial concentration." Id.
156. Id. at 821.
157. Id. Shannon also held that "increase or maintenance of racial concentration is prima facie
* . .at variance with the national housing policy."
Id. "The essence of the procedural point in
Shannon is simply that HUD's opinion must be informed on matters affecting its § 3608(e)(5)"
duty. SCHWEMM, supra note 74, at 21-13. Shannon has been "cited with approval by the Supreme
Court ... in both Trafficante and Bellwood." Id. at 21-21.
158. Alschuler v. HUD, 686 F.2d 472, 482 (7th Cir. 1982) ("As part of HUD's duty under the
Fair Housing Act, an approved housing project must not be located in an area of undue minority
concentration, which would have the effect of perpetuating racial segregation."); Otero v.
NYCHA, 484 F.2d 1122, 1133-34 (2d Cir. 1973):
[t]he affirmative duty ... also requires that consideration be given to the impact of
proposed public housing programs on the racial concentration in the area in which
the proposed housing is to be built. Action must be taken to fulfill, as much as
possible, the goal of open, integrated residential housing patterns and to prevent the
increase of segregation, in ghettos, of racial groups whose lack of opportunities the
Act was designed to combat."
see id. (holding this duty applies also to the NYCHA and may justify disregarding commitment to
priority rehousing for displacees); see Garrett v. City of Hamtramck, 503 F.2d 1236, 1247 (6th
Cir. 1974); see also Jones v. HUD, 390 F. Supp. 579, 590 (E.D. La. 1974); Blackshear Residents
Org. v. Housing Authority of City of Austin, 347 F. Supp. 1138, 1145-49 (W.D. Tex. 1971);
SCHWEMM, supra note 74, at 21-11. In Anderson v. City of Alpharetta, 737 F.2d 1530, 1535 (1 th
Cir. 1984), the court acknowledged that § 3608(d) was enacted
[b]ecause federal housing administrators had traditionally given little consideration
to the impact of their decisions on the racial or socio-economic composition of a
given neighborhood ...The bill's sponsors sought to remedy this bureaucratic myopia by requiring federal housing administrators to take account of the effect of their
funding decisions upon the racial and socio-economic composition of affected areas.
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substantially complying with the statutory obligations. 159 Most recently,
this position was endorsed in NAACP, Boston Chapter v. Secretary,1 6 °

wherein the court held that § 3608 imposes a duty (there, on HUD) to
"consider [the effect] [of agency action] on the racial and socio-economic composition of the surrounding area." 161
While most of these cases involved HUD, the courts have recognized that the standards of § 3608 are the same for other agencies. 162 To
the extent that § 3608(e) requires that HUD take racial and socio-economic data into account, the substantially identical language of
§ 3608(d) requires that the Treasury provide that racial and socio-economic concentration be taken into account. 16 3 Furthermore, since the
159. HUD's site selection regulations were developed to comply with Shannon and "have been
held to 'substantially comply' with 'the mandate of Title VIII and the other statutes that impose an
affirmative duty to integrate on HUD."' SCHWEMM, supra note 74, at 21-11. "HUD's [site and
neighborhood standards] regulations substantially comply with this mandate ....
Alschuler,
686 F.2d at 482; see also Bus. Ass'n of Univ. City v. Landrieu, 660 F.2d 867, 869-70 (3d Cir.
1981); South East Chicago Cmsn. v. HUD, 488 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1973); Jones v. Tully, 378 F.
Supp. 286, 292 (E.D. N.Y. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Meade, 510 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1975);
Glendale Neighborhood Ass'n v. Greensboro Housing Auth., 956 F. Supp. 1270, 1277 (M.D.N.C.
1996) (HUD's regulations implement statutory duty affirmatively to promote racial integration).
160. 817 F.2d at 149.
161. Id. at 156.
162. See, e.g., Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571, 578 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding plaintiffs have
standing to challenge the "allocation of funds . . . which contributes to the perpetuation of
[segregated] living patterns ....
). The Sixth Circuit's decision in Madison-Hughes v. Shalala,
80 F.3d 1121 (6th Cir. 1996), is not to the contrary. In Madison-Hughes, plaintiffs complained
that HHS violated Title VI by not collecting specified data respecting race and national origin.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that judicial review was
precluded by 5 U.S.C. § 701. (Technically, the dismissal should have been not for want of
jurisdiction but for want of a cause of action under the APA.)
There are two critical differences between Madison-Hughes and the LIHTC program. First,
HHS did collect some racial data; the complaint was about the quality and timing of the data, not
about a complete abdication of responsibility to collect data. As the court said, plaintiffs
complained "about the level of enforcement and monitoring by the agency," not that HHS "has
completely abdicated its duty to monitor noncompliance and collect data sufficient to ensure
enforcement of Title VI." Id. at 1131. Even the court in Madison-Hughes suggested that there
might be review of such a failure to act. The Treasury, by contrast, collects and maintains no
racial data whatsoever. Second, the legal standards upon which plaintiffs relied in MadisonHughes were only Title VI and its implementing regulations; plaintiffs could place no reliance
upon such specific standards as § 3608. The regulation in Madison-Hughes has "further
qualifying language [stating that the agency should] to the fullest extent practicable seek the
cooperation of recipients in obtaining compliance. Based on the use of such qualifying phrases,
we believe 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(b) commits the collection of data to agency discretion, rather than
mandating specific requirements." Id. at 1126. Indeed, one of the cases that the Madison-Hughes
court distinguished, Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1994), was more like a § 3608
situation, for it involved a statute that allowed a waiver only if specified statutory purposes would
be served.
163. As Barrios concluded, "courts have held this collection of racial data in an
institutionalized fashion to be required of HUD under Section 3608 and the APA, where it is
'necessary to make an informed decision as to whether the proposed site will further integration.'
The Service has never collected racial data, nor required the state agencies to collect it. Thus, it is
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Treasury regulation makes the LIHTC program subject to HUD regulations, this is the standard that now governs the tax credit program.
The Treasury's statutory duty is to "use its grant programs to assist
in ending discrimination and segregation, to the point where the supply
of genuinely open housing increases."" 6 The agency is required "to
assess negatively those aspects of a proposed course of action that would
further limit the supply of genuinely open housing and to assess positively those aspects of a proposed course of action that would increase
that supply."' 6 5 Accordingly, the Treasury's role in the LIHTC selection
process is to set for the allocating agencies site-selection standards that
satisfy this mandate.
It may be that the best resolution would be for the Treasury to
direct the housing credit agencies to adopt the resolution provided by
HUD for the HOPE VI program. HUD requires that, in selecting those
sites, the public agency may, at its election, comply with either the public housing site and neighborhood standards or with standards provided
in the HOPE VI document. The HOPE VI standards recite that
the fundamental goal of HUD's fair housing policy is to make full
and free housing choice a reality, so that households of all races can
freely decide between minority and white neighborhoods, when
minority neighborhoods are no longer deprived of essential public
and private resources, and when stable, racially mixed neighborhoods
are available as a meaningful choice for all.' 66
To make that "full and free housing choice a reality," sites are to be
"selected so as to advance two complimentary goals:
(i) expand assisted housing opportunities in non-minority neighborhoods, opening up choices throughout the metropolitan area for all
assisted households; and
impossible for the Service to perform even the most minimal of fair housing duties ..
supra note 24, at 23.
164. NAACP, Boston Chapter, 817 F.2d at 155. HUD must "affirmatively ...

" Barrios,

promote racial

integration" and it has an "affirmative duty to avoid segregation." Glendale Neighborhood Ass'n
v. Greensboro Housing Auth., 956 F. Supp 1270, 1276 (M.D.N.C. 1996); "HUD [has a] statutory
duty to integrate," King v. Harris, 464 F. Supp. 827, 839 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. King v.
Faymor Dev. Co., 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 446 U.S. 905 (1980).
165. NAACP, Boston Chapter,817 F.2d at 156. The substantive standards regarding economic
concentration may be different in the LIHTC program because of the tax credit legislation's
specific preference for DDAs and QCTs. The data in the Abt report strongly suggest that the
incentive system has been effective in influencing the locations of tax credit projects: almost 37%
of the projects and units were located in either Difficult Development Areas or Qualified Census
Tracts. ABT REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-10. In 1992-94, 36.6% of units in this data set were in
either DDAS or QCTs. In 1992, 26.8% of the tax credit units were in QCTs. Id. at 4-10. The
data also suggest that, in other respects, leaving locational decisions primarily to developers may
not effectively serve national housing goals.
166. HUD FY 1997 Revitalization Grant Agreement 14 (available from author). For this point,
too, I am indebted to Richard Gervase.
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(ii) reinvest in minority neighborhoods, improving the quality and
affordability of housing there to represent a real choice for assisted
households." 16 7 Whether it adopts this or another standard, the Treasury
must assure that civil rights concerns are taken into account by housing
credit agencies in allocating the tax credit.
C.

Treasury Regulations Should Specify What Tax Credit Developers
Must Do to Satisfy Civil Rights Obligations
1. Treasury regulations should require each developer to certify

annually that:
a. it is in compliance with Title VIII, HUD and Treasury civil
rights regulations, and all other federal, state, and local civil rights
laws;

16 8

1 69
b. it has trained its staff about these civil rights requirements;

c. it advises applicants and residents of their fair housing rights and
the ways in which they can seek redress for perceived violations, including violations of the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of
§ 8 status; 70 and

d. no fair housing complaints have been filed against it or any
associated person or entity or explain any that have.
167. Id.
168. Washington State requires an Affirmative Marketing Plan which includes "explicit
assurances" that, inter alia, "the Project will be operated, maintained, and rented" consistent with
civil rights laws, including Titles VII and VI, and "in a manner that does not discriminate" on the
basis of race, creed, color, sex, national origin, familial status, religion, marital status, age,
disability, or source of income. WSHFC Program Guidelines 99 (Rev. Feb. 28, 1997).
169. Compare the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which conducts fair lending
seminars and "participates in banking industry education efforts through conferences and other
events and publication of papers and issuances, regarding fair lending to examiners and banks."
Jones v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 983 F. Supp. 197, 204 n.10 (D.D.C 1997).
170. To assure that affected persons are advised of their rights and of the ways in which they
can assert these rights, the Treasury can adapt HUD's Title VI regulations, especially 24 C.F.R.
§ 1.6(d) (1998).
The Treasury should improve upon HUD's information-forcing regulation by being specific
about the ways in which the rights should be explained. Videos should be used as well as print,
for the many people who cannot read. "A 1992 survey by the U.S. Department of Education's
National Center for Education Statistics estimated that about 21% of the adult population-more
than 40 million Americans over the age of 16-had only rudimentary reading and writing skills."
National Center for Education Statistics, 1992 National Adult Literacy survey, <http.//nces.ed.
gov/nadlits/overview.html>. The video and other information should be provided not only at
rental offices but at other sites, such as public assistance offices, frequented by those who might
otherwise be discouraged from applying for tax credit units. The Treasury's LIHTC regulation
should require that participants, beneficiaries, applicants and other interested persons be advised
of their right to file administrative complaints, to elect to have the Department of Justice pursue
their claims, or to bring their own suits. See 24 C.F.R. Part 103 (1998). In addition, it should
make clear the advantage of advising the credit agency of the problems so that the developer may
be faced with the loss of the tax credit.
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Each developer must be required to maintain and implement an
affirmative fair housing marketing plan and explain how it will affirmatively further fair housing. The Treasury may define furthering fair
housing as either providing housing opportunities to victims of past discrimination or segregation or offering opportunities for integrated living.
2. Treasury regulations should require all applicants for the credit
to describe the racial and ethnic characteristics of the area in which the
project will be located.
3. Treasury regulations should expressly require developers to
report at initial rent-up and annually on the racial, ethnic, Section 8, and
other protected characteristics of each project's occupants, so that the
agency can ascertain whether a problem of discrimination or segregation
exists.
These data already are required under HUD regulations (which the
Treasury regulation makes binding on the tax credit program). 7 ' The
data are expressly required of the LIHTC projects that have Department
72
of Agriculture or HUD assistance.
The data are essential. As social scientists working in this field
have said, "data are key" for enforcement and monitoring of fair housing
73
and civil rights requirements:
good-quality, accessible information systems about public expenditures are not frills; they are fundamental components of a monitoring
system needed to ensure equity and protect civil rights requirements
...To determine whether these standards [to affirmatively further
fair housing] are satisfied, we must ascertain who benefits from public programs. For this we need information on the characteristics of
program beneficiaries, including data on the economic, demographic,
disability, racial, and ethnic
characteristics of families and individuals
74
receiving assistance.'
Indeed, the LIHTC program is almost unique among subsidized housing
171. Sponsors must maintain current data on the race and ethnicity of applicants and
beneficiaries for HUD programs. See supra note 139.
Similar requirements are imposed, under Title VI, on most federal agencies. See supra note
139.
172. See supra note 139.
173. Anne B. Shlay & Charles E. King, Beneficiaries of FederalHousing Programs: A Data
Reconnaissance, 6 HousING POLICY DEBATE 481, 486 (1995).

174. Id. at 481-83. "No data system is currently in place or being put into place that will
permit any assessment of the racial characteristics of beneficiaries of programs administered by
the Treasury Department through the IRS. Therefore, these programs cannot be monitored to
ensure compliance with the Fair Housing Act." Id. at 520. Section 3608(a) requires the HUD
Secretary and the Agriculture Secretary to collect, "not less than annually, data on the racial and
ethnic characteristics of persons eligible for, assisted, or otherwise benefitting under each
community development, housing assistance, and mortgage and loan insurance and guarantee
program administered by such Secretary." 42 U.S.C. § 3608a(a) (1996).
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programs in not requiring housing owners to collect and report such
data.175 This is so despite the fact that HUD regulations (which the
Treasury regulation makes applicable to the tax credit program) require

that all persons receiving assistance through any housing activities subject to EO 11063 "shall maintain data regarding the race, religion,
176
national origin and sex of each applicant."'
V.

CONCLUSION

Housing discrimination and segregation impose immense costs on
individuals and on society as a whole. Federal agencies that administer
housing programs are required affirmatively to further non-discrimination and desegregation. The Treasury Department, which operates the
largest contemporary subsidized housing program in the United States,
has not acted effectively against discrimination and segregation. The
suggestions in this article are advanced with the hope that the Treasury
will satisfy its vital mandate.

175. LIHTC projects may be the only federally subsidized multifamily rental projects that do
not require tenant certification and reporting on race and ethnicity. See Shlay & King, supra note
173, at 490, 493-96. Requiring such data collection would not significantly add to the burdens on
LIHTC developers. In general, each LIHTC developer now is required to secure an annual
income certification from each low-income tenant and documentation to support that certification.
26 C.F.R. § 1.42-5(c)(1)(iv) (1998).
176. 24 C.F.R. § 107.30 (1998); see also 24 C.F.R. § 1.6(b) (1998) (HUD's Title VI
regulations require that "in general, recipients should have available for the department racial and
ethnic data showing the extent to which members of minority groups are beneficiaries of federally
assisted programs.") HUD collects such data for tenants of Public Housing Agencies, Indian
Housing Authorities, Section 8 voucher and certificate holders, and privately owned multifamily
housing assisted by HUD. Certain mortgage lenders are required to provide this kind of data on
all mortgage loan applicants. 24 C.F.R. § 107.30(h) (1997). The Federal National Mortgage
Association and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation "must report to HUD ... the racial,
economic, gender, and first-time home-buyer characteristics associated with all loans that they
purchased after January 1, 1993." Shlay & King, supra note 173, at 497-98, 510, 515.

